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THE ROOTS OF MODERN CAPITALISM:
A MARXIST ACCOUNTING HISTORY OF
THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
CAPITALIST LANDLORDS IN ENGLAND
Abstract: A major debate neglected by accounting historians is the
importance of landlords in the English agricultural revolution. The
paper uses accounting evidence from the historical literature to test
Marx’s theory that, from around 1750, England’s landlords played a
pivotal role by adopting and then spreading the capitalist mentality
and social relations by enclosures and changes in the management of
their estates and tenants. It gives an accounting interpretation of
Marx’s theory of rent and argues that the available evidence supports
his view that the conversion of English landlords to capitalism under-
lay the later stages of the agricultural revolution. The conclusion ex-
plains the linkages in Marx’s theory between the agricultural and
industrial revolutions, and calls on accounting historians to conduct
archival research into the agricultural roots of modern capitalism.
INTRODUCTION
To fulfill the promise of accounting history we must engage
with important theoretical and historical debates, particularly
those about the genealogy of modern business. A critical debate,
neglected by accounting historians, concerns the origin of busi-
ness in agriculture. Economic historians have struggled to ex-
plain the ‘agricultural revolution’, the massive increase in output
that by around 1850 allowed England’s population to grow
through previous historical limits. Many believe the period
“c.1700 - c.1850 . . . was a time of momentous change, in which
the output of English agriculture increased by a factor of around
3.5 . . . ” [Wade Martins and Williamson, 1999, p. 2]. Most agree
on the broad outlines of the change. In 1500 around 80% of the
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British population worked in agriculture, and by 1850 it was
only one in four. Between 1770 and 1850 Britain’s population
doubled, but it maintained and may eventually have even in-
creased overall living standards without large imports of food.
Output per worker in agriculture probably doubled. By 1800,
while many small farmers survived, England had a unique rural
structure with many landlords leasing farms to tenants who em-
ployed landless wage laborers. Except for some areas of the Low
Countries, it had the most productive agriculture in the world.
Many think a particularly important factor was the increase in
labor productivity that was much faster in England than in Eu-
rope. Nevertheless, exactly “when and how this dramatic trans-
formation was brought about is a matter of considerable de-
bate . . . ” [Campbell and Overton, 1991, p. 5; see also, Overton,
1996a, p. 1; Turner, Beckett and Afton, 2001, Preface]. Modern
historians, however, unite in their scorn for the traditional ex-
planation that the revolution was the product of an “increase in
rationality, a new spirit of commercialism in farming” because
it is “consistent with nearly any pattern” of change [McCloskey,
1972, p. 30]. Lord Ernle, for example, the authoritative early
20th century agricultural historian, thought that driving the
revolution was a “new race of men” (1961, p. 222). The paper
supports the traditional approach by precisely defining this new
rationality as a ‘calculative mentality’, and uses accounting to
explain and then test Marx’s theory that the English agricultural
revolution was a critical element in the transition from feudal-
ism to industrial capitalism.
Historians neglect Marx’s theory even though many accept a
broadly similar chronology. Marx saw the beginnings of change
in the late 15th century, but thought the revolution began with
the formation of a class of capitalist farmers by around 1670,
and that capitalist landlords spread and deepened the revolution
from around 1750.1 Historians often argue an important ele-
ment from 1750 was that many English landlords began to see
“it was in their commercial interests to take a positive lead in
promoting change . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, pp. 157, 171]. For ex-
ample, from 1700 to 1750 an index of English and Welsh land-
lords’ investment in “Structures, etc.,” increased from 112 to
1 Always remembering that “epochs in the history of society are no more
separated from each other by hard and fast lines of demarcation, than are
geological epochs” [Marx, 1996, p. 374]. ‘Revolution’ can mean profound change
or rapid change. Here we mean profound change, no matter that it took 200
years or more.
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114, but from 1750 to 1800 it increased to 143, and by 1850 to
232 [Allen, 1994, Table 5.4, p. 109]. E.P. Thompson detected
what he called an “important moment of transition” around
1750. He noted the landlords’ “far more aggressive agrarian pos-
ture” and “meticulous . . . attention to accountancy . . . ” [Th-
ompson, 1978, p. 44]. The paper argues that these changes came
from the landlords’ conversion to capitalism. Modern historians,
by contrast, often assume the English landlord had always been
a “capitalist”, an “entrepreneur” who “had to take decisions
about the use of his own capital . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, pp. 137,
138; Mingay, 1963, p. 268].2 The question they do not ask is why,
in that case, it was only from around 1750 that landlords began
to demand “a level of profit sufficient to support the lifestyle
expected of an aristocrat . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, p. 138]? It is no
answer to say that the “expanding economy, . . . widening mar-
kets and rising prices . . . invited . . . sufficiently flexible . . . land-
owners to invest more capital and farmers to improve productiv-
ity . . . ” [Mingay, 1963b, p. 284]. We must ask why English
landlords, unlike their continental counterparts, were “suffi-
ciently flexible” to accept the invitation of the markets by invest-
ing to increase productivity? The answer, the paper argues, re-
veals their vital contribution. It was not simply the provision of
capital. As Mingay himself suggests, the landlords’ most signifi-
cant contribution was “perhaps their attitude toward economic
development . . . ” [1963, p. 201]. The paper defines this attitude
and uses accounting evidence to support Marx’s view that their
vital contribution was spreading capitalist social relations and
its mentality which gave the idea of “improvement” its mean-
ing.3
The paper first explains Marx’s theory of the transition to
capitalism, his theory of the agricultural revolution, and his
theory of rent, as integral elements of a testable accounting his-
tory. According to Marx, to become capitalists, landlords had to
adopt a rate-of-return-on-capital mentality. The paper then ar-
gues that this mentality spread throughout the landlord class
during the financial revolution of the late 17th and early 18th
centuries. The following part examines Marx’s assertion that the
2 I shall follow Marx and most historians who refer to landlords, farmers,
etc., in the masculine, even though “estate affairs were often temporarily or
permanently in the hands of wives, daughters, or widows” [Mingay, 1976, p. 89].
3 In the 18th century ‘improvement’ usually meant investment in agriculture
for profit; ‘To enhance in monetary value’ (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on
Historical Principles, 1973]. “[W]hen landlords spoke of ‘improvement’, it was
usually an ‘improved rental’ they had in mind . . . ” [Mingay, 1963, p. 172].
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capitalist mentality — the search for higher rents by increasing
the rate of return on the capital employed in the farm — drove
parliamentary enclosures. It concludes that landlords used en-
closures to impose capitalist accountability on their tenants,
thereby spreading its relations and mentality. Rents usually in-
creased sharply after enclosure, and continued to increase well
into the 19th century. Marx was critical of Ricardo’s theory of
rent that attempted to explain these increases. Economic histo-
rians often rely on Ricardo’s theory to explain the rent setting
process and the historical trends. The paper contrasts Marx’s
and Ricardo’s theory of rent as alternative accounting histories,
and criticizes Allen’s [1992] well-known use of Ricardo’s theory
to support his controversial assertion that enclosures did little to
further the agricultural revolution. Put simply, Ricardo’s theory
implies that accounting was irrelevant to enclosures and manag-
ing rents, whereas Marx’s theory implies that it was central to
both. The paper argues that Ricardo based his theory on a faulty
understanding of capitalist accounting that Allen perpetuates.
Finally, the paper explores the accounting implications of
Marx’s theory for how capitalist landlords should manage their
rents. It discusses how English landlords determined their rents;
how they chose the length of their leases and the size of their
farms; how they made fixed capital and other investments; and
supports Marx’s theory with the available accounting evidence.
The conclusion explains the linkages in Marx’s theory between
the agricultural and industrial revolutions, his ‘queer story’ of
rent in which English landlords helped to create the industrial
revolution that, ultimately, undermined their position as a pow-
erful class by turning them into investors, undifferentiated ele-
ments of the capitalist class. The paper concludes that account-
ing historians can make a critical contribution to important
historical debates by elaborating and testing Marx’s theory of
the transition to capitalism against the large amount of still
unexplored archival material available.
A MARXIST ACCOUNTING HISTORY OF
THE ENGLISH AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION
Marx argued that industrial society emerged from long pro-
cesses of class conflict resulting in the overthrow of the feudal
mode of production by the capitalist mode of production. A
society’s mode of production combines its ‘forces of production’
— the material and human means of production — and its ‘so-
cial relations of production’ — the modal relations of economic
4
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superiority and subordination that condition the way owners of
the means of production extract surplus value from labor. Ac-
counting is central to understanding and testing Marx’s theory
because rationalizing and reproducing each set of social rela-
tions — each way of extracting surplus — is a particular calcula-
tive mentality and a mode of accountability [Bryer, 2000a]. The
feudal mentality pursued the direct appropriation of surplus la-
bor (labor itself, commodities or cash) from self-sufficient peas-
ants, and feudal landlords and merchants kept income and ex-
penditure accounts. The capitalist mentality pursues the rate of
return on capital employed in production by extracting surplus
value from the sale of commodities or services produced by
wage labor, and the capitalist keeps balance sheets and profit
and loss accounts. To use this correspondence to explain and
test Marx’s theory of the agricultural revolution and the role of
landlords, we must first explain his theory of the transition to
capitalism as a testable accounting history of the interrelation-
ships between revolutions in the social relations of production
and revolutions in accounting and calculative mentalities. Marx
proposed a two-step transition to the capitalist mode of produc-
tion that we should observe as the transition from the feudal to
the capitalist way of accounting.4 Step one is from the feudal to
a transitional, ‘capitalistic’ or ‘semi-capitalist’ mentality and
ways of accounting. Step two is from the semi-capitalist to the
capitalist mentality and accounting. Figure 1 summarizes the
ideal-typical historical modes of accounting we should see ac-
cording to Marx’s theory:
4 This and the following two paragraphs summarise a discussion of Marx’s
theory of the transition to capitalism and the views of his critics and supporters
in Bryer [2000a] and a preliminary survey of accounting evidence in Bryer
[2000b].
FIGURE 1
Accounting Signatures of the Transition
from Feudalism to Capitalism
Calculative Feudal Semi-capitalist Capitalist
Mentality
Accounting Consumable CS Profit
Signature Surplus ——————— ———————
(CS) Opening Capital Capital Employed
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Marx says the first decisive step towards capitalism oc-
curred around 1550 when some farmers undertook enclosures
and employed wage labor. Although, like modern capitalists
these farmers exploited wage labor, they were only “formally”
capitalists, only semi-capitalists, because they made no attempt
to change the methods of production, and continued to pursue
feudal surplus using charge and discharge accounting. Semi-
capitalists of a different kind appeared in trade with the first
joint stock companies. These enterprises, employing socialized
capitals, were the first to pursue a rate of return on capital.5
These merchants were only semi-capitalists because they pur-
sued consumable surplus divided by the initial capital advanced.
The capitalist mentality is the product of the semi-capitalist re-
lations and mentalities that emerged in agriculture and trade.
Capital from the land flowed into trade, and capital from trade
flowed back onto the land bringing with it the return-on-capital
mentality. Farmers harnessed the merchant’s rate of return
mentality to their mentality of exploiting labor in production
giving us the capitalist mentality. This mentality was revolution-
ary because it drove farmers, landlords, entrepreneurs and, ulti-
mately, managers to continuously increase the intensity and
productivity of labor to earn an excess return on capital. Capital-
ists, in short, pursued the ‘real subsumption’ of labor by manag-
ing production to increase the return on capital employed.
Capitalism appeared when peasants became “free” wage
workers and faced “free” capital [Marx, 1973, p. 502-503]. Capi-
tal began to win its freedom when landed and mercantile inter-
ests merged as semi-capitalist farmers invested in privateering
ventures, for exploration, commodity production and interna-
tional trade. Conflicts over who would reap the rewards from
international trade culminated in the ‘bourgeois revolution’ of
5 The paper uses the terms ‘socialised’ and ‘social capital’ to describe a con-
tinuum from recognisably social to fully social capital, the “thing” that Marx
called “total social capital” [Marx, 1988, p. 23]. Socialised and social capitals are
both pooled. Socialised capital involves pooling across a limited number of
investors for limited purposes. Capital becomes social by losing its identity with
its owner, but in the early stages with socialised capital there are restrictions on
who can invest in the capital and its purposes — on the transferability and the
uses of capital. An example is a partnership where the entry of a new partner
requires the agreement of the other partners. By contrast, at its upper limit fully
social capital involves pooling across all investors and all investments. All mem-
bers of an investing society can participate in a social capital; the capital is freely
usable for any lawful business; and is freely transferable - for example, market-
able government debt and listed shares. Here the identity of the owner with the
functioning of capital disappears and the social restrictions are minimal.
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the mid-17th century which resulted in the victory of the rate-of-
return-on-capital mentality over the feudal mentality [Bryer,
2000b]. The bourgeois revolution paved the way for the ‘finan-
cial revolution’ that matured into a large and active market in
government debt. In Marx’s theory, the financial or “credit sys-
tem . . . is itself on the one hand an immanent form of the
capitalist mode of production and on the other hand a driving
force of its development into the highest and last possible
form . . . ” [1981, p. 742]. Government debt provided a riskless
foundation for the development of joint stock companies [Marx,
1976b, pp. 919-920]. Capital gained its freedom in these markets
for social capital where the required return on capital appeared
and provided the owners of capital with the means for judging
their investments [Bryer, 1994a].
Peasants were ‘freed’ from their land by enclosures that
reached a new intensity from the 1760s, completing by parlia-
mentary means a process that began in the 16th century. Marx
thought that many farmers became capitalists from 1670 to
1750 helping to create capitalist landlords [1981, pp. 276, 751,
754, 938]: “the farmer turns capitalist before capitalists become
farmers . . . ” [1969a, p. 17]. In other words, ordinary farmers
became capitalists before landlords and merchants became capi-
talist farmers. According to Marx, landlords became capitalists
in two steps. The first was the appearance of capitalist tenant
farmers turning their landlords into de facto capitalists, even
though they were not necessarily consciously active capitalists.
Landlords as a class took the second step when social capital on
a national scale and the first real land market appeared and the
typical landlord’s mentality changed from a focus on feudal rent
to a focus on the rate-of-return on capital. Semi-capitalist land-
lords soon became conscious and active capitalists if they had
capitalist farmer tenants. Capitalist landed property “is a spe-
cific historical form, a form transformed by the intervention of
capital and the capitalist mode of production . . . ” [Marx, 1981,
pp. 751, 754]. In other words, capitalist farmers and social capi-
tal created capitalist landlords. Capitalist farmers engage in the
real subsumption of labor. This, Marx says, only gets “under
way” from around 1670, and improvement and cost reductions
only “set in” from around 1750 [1981, p. 938]. Marx’s theory, in
short, is that “wage labour in its totality is initially created by the
action of capital on landed property, and then, as soon as the
latter has been produced as a form, by the proprietor of the land
himself. This latter then ‘clears’ . . . the land of its excess
mouths . . . ” [Marx, 1981, p. 276]. Modern landed property
7
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appears as a “form” when capitalist farmers appear, and then,
says Marx, the “proprietor”, the landlord, finishes the job. Driv-
ing him to clear his land of excess mouths — that is, to increase
labor productivity through enclosures and other investment —
was the landlord’s conversion to capitalism.
Capitalist landlords were a necessary condition for the in-
dustrial revolution: “Although capital can develop itself com-
pletely as commercial capital without th[e] transformation of
landed property it cannot do so as industrial capital . . . ” [Marx,
1981, p. 277]. First, capitalist landlords led in completing the
creation of universal wage labor [Marx, 1981, pp. 276-277]. Sec-
ond, through enclosures, other investment, and the active man-
agement of their tenants, landlords made capitalist attitudes the
common form. To become a capitalist the landlord “needs only
to transform his workers into wage workers and to produce for
profit instead of for revenue . . . ” [Marx, 1981, p. 277], that is,
change his mentality to produce for capitalist profit instead of
feudal rent. As the capitalist mentality spread in agriculture, it
spread in ‘industry’ because “[o]riginally, agricultural labour
and industrial labour are not separate: the second is an append-
age of the first . . . ” [Marx, 1981, pp. 770-771]. As the real
subsumption of labor gave an economic advantage, the capital-
ist revolution quickly spread: “Once it has appropriated agricul-
ture and mining, the manufacture of the principal textiles, etc.,
it moves on to other sectors . . . ” [Marx, 1976b, p. 1036]. The
capitalist appropriation of industry is Marx’s ‘industrial revolu-
tion’ [Bryer, 2004b]. Figure 2 summarizes Marx’s history of the
capitalist revolution.
In reading figure 2 we must remember that class conflict
drove each transition. Marx’s history of capitalism is the history
of how socialized and social capital eroded and eventually over-
threw “the socio-political limits in which capital was con-
fined . . . ” [Marx, 1976b, p. 1030]. It will take accounting histori-
ans many years to test all aspects of Marx’s theory of the
transition to capitalism. The focus for this paper is when and
how English landlords became capitalists, Marx’s landlords’
revolution, and its consequences.
The Landlords’ Revolution: An important element in creating
capitalist landlords was the change to money rents and legally
secure leases from the late 16th century. Apart from allowing
the farmer to keep a surplus as prices rose and rents lagged
behind, when the capitalist farmer appeared the legal basis of
money rents also promoted the transition to the capitalist land-
8
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lord [Marx, 1981, p. 934]. When the landlord got contractually
determined capitalist rent he became, de facto, a capitalist:
“With the intervention of the capitalist farmer between the land-
owner and the actual working tiller . . . [t]he nature of rent
thereby changes. . . . Instead of rent, the normal form of surplus-
value is now profit, and rent now counts as . . . surplus
profit . . . ” [Marx, 1981, pp. 935-936]. Rent becomes “generally
acknowledged” as surplus profit, that is, by the landlords as
well. Surplus profit is the excess of a farm’s total profit over that
part retained by the farmer. Only after 1750 did this, Marx’s
capitalist rent, become rent’s “normal and dominant form”.
Landlords had commuted most labor rents and rents in kind
into contractual money rents by around 1600. During the 17th
century most landlords gave up farming for themselves, letting
almost all their land to tenants for money rent. However, it does
not necessarily follow that “capitalist relations had arrived in
the English countryside . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, p. 136]. In Marx’s
theory, money rents remained feudal unless the tenant was a
capitalist. For example, in Aberdeenshire money rents had re-
placed feudal obligations by 1600, but as late as 1780 landlords
“had not yet come to define the main potential of their estates to
be capitalistic rent . . . ” [Carter, 1977, p. 54]. Aberdeenshire
FIGURE 2
Marx’s History of the Capitalist Revolution
1550 1650 1750
FS/OC r r
 socialised merchant  bourgeois revolution financial revolution
capital
 WL  P/CE  P/CE
 semi-capitalist capitalist  capitalist
farmers farmers  landlords
agricultural/manufacturing/industrial revolutions
Key: = influence of social relations and mentality
FS = feudal surplus
OC = opening capital
WL = wage labor
P = profit
CE = capital employed
r = the required return on capital
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landed property only became “thoroughly capitalist, simply a
source of ground rent for the owner” [Carter, 1977, p. 56] by the
end of the Napoleonic wars.6 Marx would agree that this did not
mean “responsibility had therefore passed from the landown-
ers . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, p. 136]. Landlords gave up farming dur-
ing the 17th century, and this time for good, not only because
their feudal powers had declined, but because they had, for the
first time, adopted the rate-of-return on capital mentality. When
larger landowners no longer “wished to tie capital up in farm
stock . . . [t]he view became firmly established that if there was
capital to spare it was safer and possibly more lucrative to invest
it in mortgages, purchase of land or the Funds . . . ” [Mingay,
1963b, pp. 168-169].
Also pushing landlords towards the rate-of-return on capital
mentality was the land market starting in the late 17th century.
In this market, “the capitalized rent, the price of land, and there-
fore its alienability and actual alienation, now becomes an im-
portant aspect . . . ” [Marx, 1981, p. 938]. Besides its direct im-
pact on the landlords’ mentality, this market helped to drive the
transition in other ways. One important consequence was that
“urban and other holders of money can buy plots of land with a
view to leasing them either to peasants or to capitalists, and
enjoy the rent on their capital thus invested as a form of inter-
est. This factor, too, helps to promote the transformation of the
former mode of exploitation, of the relationship between owner
and actual tiller, and of rent itself . . . ” [Marx, 1981, p. 938].
Fuelling the land market were Royalist attempts to recover es-
tates after the Restoration, demand from the larger landowners
to consolidate and extend their estates, and demand for land
from wealthy merchants and businessmen. Finally, and criti-
cally important in promoting the rate-of-return mentality, was
the appearance of a national capital market, based on a huge
growth in public debt to finance war in the interest of trade. By
1750 landlords generally saw investment in stocks and shares or
land as essentially the same because both provided a return on
capital. With growing indebtedness, rising rents, and the finan-
cial benefits of capitalist agriculture plain for all to see, many
landlords became consciously and actively capitalist. Now they
wanted their tenants to increase their rents by increasing the
rate-of-return on the capital invested in their farms. This could
6 As Carter defines neither capitalistic, capitalist nor ground rent, we take
his description at face value.
10
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explain why only then “a growing number of landlords became
actively engaged in the process of agricultural improvement”,
whereas before 1750 “few of them had taken a personal interest
in the farming on their estates . . . ” [Roebuck, 1973, p. 17]. Ac-
cording to Marx, before 1750 most landlords retained their feu-
dal mentality. We can directly test this theory by translating it
into accounting ideas and looking for changes in the ways land-
lords accounted for rents.
An Accounting Translation of Marx’s Theory of Capitalist Ground
Rent: According to Marx, the transition to capitalism entailed a
change in the mode of accountability [Bryer, 2000a]. If so, we
should find changes in the ways landlords calculated their rents
and used accounts to manage their tenants. Feudal rent (FR) is
the total consumable surplus (CS) from a farm minus the con-
sumption of the farmer (FC). That is, FR = CS - FC. Here we
expect the landlord to account for cash flows or income and
expenditure in the feudal fashion using charge and discharge
accounting, and to use coercive individual accountability. Capi-
talist rent, by contrast, is the total profit of the farm minus the
farmer’s profit, that is, the general or average rate of profit on
the capital the farmer owns, and the accountability is economic.
Instead of coercion, the landlord relies on market forces and
accounting calculations to discipline his tenants into producing
the maximum rate-of-return on capital from the farm. The gen-
eral or average rate of profit emerges in industry and trade. In
modern finance theory the equivalent is the required return on
the market portfolio [Bryer, 1994a]. Marx’s theory of capitalist
rent is simply that “[l]anded property enables the proprietor to
lay hold of the difference between the individual profit and the
average profit . . . ” [Marx, 1981, p. 787]:
Ri = riKTi - rGKFi.
Ri = capitalist ground rent from farm i;
ri = the rate-of-return on the capital employed in farm i;
KTi = the total capital employed in farm i by the landlord
KTi = and the farmer,
rG = the general rate of profit, and
KFi = the capital the farmer employs in farm i.
Marx distinguished “absolute” from “differential” rent. Ab-
solute rent is central to his theory of the interconnections be-
tween the agricultural and the industrial revolutions. He defines
it as “the excess of value over the average price of raw pro-
duce . . . ” [Marx, 1969, p. 142]. Agricultural commodities sell for
11
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more than they should because agriculture uses more labor and
less material inputs and is, therefore, less productive than indus-
try, and this is the source of the landlord’s absolute rent. Agri-
cultural products are, therefore, relatively more valuable and so
agriculture earns a higher return on capital than industry. In
industry the market competes any excess returns away. In agri-
culture it does not because the landlord steps in and collects the
excess as absolute rent [Marx, 1969b, p. 41]. On top of absolute
rent is any differential rent. Differential rent arises from farms
that earn above average profits from above average natural fer-
tility, location, or investment of capital, below average wages or
taxes, or suppressing the farmers’ returns below the general rate
of profit. Marx attributed the discovery of the theory of differen-
tial rent to James Anderson in 1777, “a practical farmer” who,
like a modern capitalist, thought “[t]he soil can be continuously
improved . . . ” [Marx, 1969b, pp. 114, 145]. The capitalist land-
lord thinks of all his rent as differential rent, and this is our
focus in parts three, four and five. The paper’s conclusion ex-
plains the role of absolute rent in Marx’s theory of the industrial
revolution.
Capitalist landlords do not pursue the largest amount of
rent, but the maximum “rate of rent”, that is, “rent in proportion
to the agricultural capital advanced . . . ” [Marx, 1969a, p. 107;
1969b, p. 113]. The rate of rent depends upon the profitability of
the farm, the proportion of the capital the landlord provides,
and the general rate of profit:
R KF
— = rF + —— [rF - rG]
KL KL
R = total rent,
KL = the landlord’s capital employed,
rF = the rate-of-return on the capital employed in the farm,
KF = the farmer’s capital employed,
rG = the general rate of profit.
According to Marx’ theory, therefore, we expect the con-
sciously active capitalist landlord’s system of accounting to en-
compass his rent, his rate of rent, the total profitability of the
farm, and the return to the farmer. A landlord’s system of ac-
counting includes not only the final accounts, that may only
record the collection of rent and his expenditures, but his whole
system of accountability which includes the financial calcula-
tions he performs and the discipline they impose on tenants to
pursue the maximum rate-of-return on capital.
12
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A capitalist landlord sets his rents so an efficient farmer
keeps the general rate of profit on his capital. If the farmer is a
capitalist he will not accept less for long. This is what Marx
means when he says that with the appearance of the capitalist
farmer the nature of rent “thereby changes”. If the farmer is a
capitalist, the landlord is to this extent “thereby” a capitalist
whether consciously and actively or not. However, there is no
guarantee that an unconscious and inactive de facto capitalist
landlord will collect the maximum rate of rent. If he charges too
much his tenants will not invest their capital or may desert his
farms. If he charges too little, he enriches his tenants at his
expense. The landlord or his tenants may invest too little or too
much. According to Marx, therefore, we should expect that as
landlords with capitalist tenants acquire the rate-of-return on
capital mentality they soon become consciously active capital-
ists and spread its mentality by imposing it on all their tenants.
We should find evidence of this transition in their accounts and
changes in their systems of accounting, in the way landlords
held their tenants accountable for rent. The landlord could tell
us he is a capitalist by the way he calculates his rent demand;
how he decides his investments in enclosures or other improve-
ments, the length of his leases, the size of his farms, or the
capital his tenants should have. English landlords came to do all
of these things in the capitalist manner. To explain why, we start
by tracing the genesis of the capitalist landlord in the history of
the financial revolution and developments in landlords’ account-
ing practices. This supports the view that the landlords’ rate-of-
return on capital mentality came from their immersion in social
capital.
THE GENESIS OF THE CAPITALIST LANDLORD
On the surface, there was nothing new in the relationships
between landlords and commerce from the late 17th century.
Landowners were not major initial investors in stocks and
shares [Beckett, 1989, p. 548]. “Men of commerce had always
entered into landownership, and there was a more restricted
inflow of such newcomers in the 18th century than in the previ-
ous two centuries . . . ” [Mingay, 1963b, p. 268]. From the later
16th century landed gentry had invested in merchant ventures
and, with some reservations, landowners continued to mingle
and merge with wealthier merchants and businessmen [Mingay,
1976, pp. 6-10]. But never before had landed society lived in a
world of social capital. From the Restoration in 1660 to the
13
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collapse of the South Sea Bubble in 1720, commercial and fi-
nancial revolutions engulfed English society [Carswell, 1993;
Dickson, 1967]. Building on a steep upturn in trade, ship-build-
ing and merchant capital, by around 1750 England had a na-
tional market for capital based on ‘public credit’, mainly govern-
ment debt to finance wars to protect and extend the North
American and West Indian markets [Dickson, 1967, p. 11]. Lon-
don was the focus, a city that inevitably drew the wealthy land-
owner and his family, and where they banked their rents. Land-
owners borrowed heavily on mortgages from insurance
companies. Many landowners may have bought stocks and
shares. Some merchants became landowners in a national land
market in which landlords were also buyers extending and con-
solidating their estates. From all these directions, landlords were
pushed to adopt the rate-of-return on capital mentality.
The Appearance of the Modern Mortgage: Under classical com-
mon law, the borrower (mortgagor) transferred the freehold of a
property to the lender (mortgagee) for the duration of the mort-
gage, usually six months. The freehold reverted to the lender if
the borrower defaulted by as little as one day, and he still owed
the principal. From around 1600 the Courts of Chancery began
accepting petitions from defaulting borrowers and ordered re-
demption of their property on payment of interest and principal
in cases of special hardship, and from 1625 it automatically gave
relief when the borrower offered payment within a reasonable
time [Simpson, 1961, p. 227]. Where the borrower did not pay,
the lender could foreclose. In the early 17th century judges be-
gan to agree that if the borrower paid the interest the lender
could not force the owner to sell land [Finch, 1956, p. 32;
Beckett, 1986, p. 296]. The elements of the modern law of mort-
gage existed by the early 17th century, but only at the end of the
century were mortgages automatically and indefinitely extend-
able so long as the borrower paid interest. Only from the 1690s
did investors consider mortgages raised on estates “as good as
investment in the ‘funds’º” [Mathias, 1983, p. 51]; “a routine
device for using land to raise long-term finance . . . ” [Allen,
1992, p. 104]. By the end of the century, if the lender wanted
repayment of his money, “normally he had no difficulty in find-
ing a purchaser to whom he could assign his mortgage . . . ”
[Finch, 1956, p. 32]. Landlords also “had no difficulty in finding
lenders, for credit was no longer dependent on the personal
reputation of the borrower . . . ” [Finch, 1956, p. 131]. This
greatly expanded their borrowing capacity, and in the 18th
14
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century they exploited it to the hilt. As their debts rose, land-
lords immersed themselves in the universe of social capital
where, perhaps, for the first time, the remorseless deduction of
interest from their rents convinced many that the rate-of-return
on capital governed their extravagant lifestyles.
Many English landlords borrowed to improve their lands.
This might explain why Denmark, Germany and France had
similar increases in wheat yields to those in England, but lower
labor productivity [Allen, 1992, pp. 1, 56]. It could also explain
why the trend towards larger farms markedly accelerated in the
18th century [Allen, 1992, p. 86]. However, the important ques-
tion is whether the appearance of modern mortgages caused
these changes, or the mentality that demanded bigger and more
productive farms produced the modern mortgage? Why was
there a delay in introducing modern mortgages? A possible ex-
planation is the widespread adoption of the rate-of-return on
capital mentality by landlords only in the 1690s with the begin-
nings of a national capital market. The notion of “long-term
finance”, that is, the clear separation of capital and interest,
exists only within the rate-of-return on capital mentality. In the
feudal mentality a mortgage is a “pledge” [Simpson, 1961, p.
132]. That is, the owner pawns his land, and in law this is no
different from pawning his silver plate. By the early 17th cen-
tury judges had established the legal principle of unfettered re-
demption — provided the borrower obeyed the laws of capital
by paying the interest. Writers and parliament began to value
land and property using present value, more and more thor-
oughly as the 17th century wore on, and lessors used it when
financing London’s rebuilding after the Great Fire of 1666
[Scorgie, 1996, pp. 240-242]. In 1668 Sir Thomas Culpeper’s
discourse in favor of reducing interest from 6% to 4%
“support[s] a contention that landowners understood and used
discounting to assist them in managing their woodlands . . . ”
[Scorgie, 1996, p. 244]. However, using the certainty of the law
as our guide, only by the 1690s was it generally accepted that
land was capital, an income earning asset in which the mort-
gagor had an inalienable “estate”, the “equity of redemption”
[Simpson, 1961, p. 228]. Chancery judges ignored contractual
agreements and applied the laws of capital. Just as the land was
capital to its owner, the debt was capital to the mortgagee,
usually secured by giving him the power of sale [Simpson, 1961,
p. 229]. The modern accounting rules of ‘deprival value’ ap-
plied to both. The value of land to a borrower is its income-
earning ability. To compensate for its loss we must give him its
15
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replacement cost, its current market value. The value of the land
to the lender, however, is only the face value of the debt, and if
we deprive him of the security of the land we must compensate
him by giving him back his money. When these rules became
widely accepted, mortgages became negotiable financial securi-
ties.
Stocks, Shares and Loans: Even if landlords had wanted to sell
their land and invest in stocks and shares, at first they had
limited opportunities. Only by 1695 did more than one hundred
joint stock companies exist [Carswell, 1993, p. 8]. Several peers
held stock in the New East India Company from the late 1680s
to 1707, and peers held stock in the Bank of England [Beckett,
1986, pp. 80-81]. From the 1690s to 1750 government borrowing
created a range of financial securities, but initially, “the landed
classes as a whole were not significant contributors of new capi-
tal for public loans . . . ” [Dickson, 1967, p. 302]. Some notable
landowners were initial investors in the funds, for example,
Lord Townshend [Dickson, 1967, p. 265; Rosenheim, 1989, p.
157]. However, many more may have invested in the secondary
markets. Evidence suggesting that they did is Sir Robert
Walpole’s reason for killing a scheme to reduce the interest on
the National Debt in 1737 that “the younger sons of landed
gentry, as well as ‘monied men’, would be sufferers . . . ”
[Langford, 1999, p. 46]. Furthermore, very few large landowners
escaped unscathed from the collapse of the South Sea Bubble in
1720 [Beckett, 1986, pp. 81, 86], which was an unforgettable
experience for them. Their flight back into land (buying land or,
more likely, lending to other landowners) and the increase in
land value forged the link between the rate of interest and the
price of land [Beckett, 1986, pp. 81-83]. By the early 18th cen-
tury “potential buyers looked at the return on the funds to de-
cide the timing of a purchase . . . ” [Beckett, 1989, p. 558]. From
around 1750, landowners are “switching their interests around
according to the rate of interest”, and they use the same ap-
proach when making investments in improvement, that is, “by
the expected rate of return . . . ” [Beckett, 1986, p. 84; 1989, pp.
565, 585, 586, 605].
The Late 17th Century Land Market: Encouraging the spread of
the capitalistic mentality in the landowning class, particularly in
the period 1650 - 1690, was an influx of wealthy merchants
[Beckett, 1986, pp. 71-73, 117, 553; Carswell, 1993, p. 9; Clay,
1985, pp. 143, 160]. There was a great deal of movement in the
16
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land market from around 1750 [Beckett, 1989, p. 552]. Notably
active were those “who were not farmers or gentry with deep
roots in the countryside, but were employed in trade, industry,
or the professions; or who lived, in an urban setting, the lives of
leisured gentlemen on incomes from the funds . . . [who] did not
see their property as a treasured inheritance but as a useful
capital asset . . . ” [Clay, 1985, p. 174]. Successful lawyers im-
mersed in commercial life were also important buyers of land
up to 1750 [Beckett, 1986, pp. 67-68]. Substantial planters from
the British West Indies with connections to the London money
market bought estates in England [Clay, 1985, p. 190]. Investors
in the ships’ companies engaged in the slave trade often did the
same [Davis, 1962]. Through the first half of the 18th century,
landowners “had to accept within their ranks men with mercan-
tile-based fortunes” [Beckett, 1989, p. 545]. Supporting Marx’s
view that this helped to promote the capitalist mentality, Defoe,
Smith and others thought that “commercial wealth . . . greatly
enhanced the economic efficiency using the land”; that
“[c]ommercial instincts brought to the land habits of accounting
and profit calculation learned in trade, habits of ploughing back
capital into a business to expand it . . . ” [Mathias, 1983, pp. 149,
5]. To test this assertion we need to examine landlords’ ac-
counts.
Landlords’ Accounts: Evidence of landlords beginning to use
double-entry bookkeeping (DEB) would suggest they had a
capitalistic mentality because DEB automatically gave them
the means to calculate rate-of-return on capital [Bryer, 1993a].
In 1660 Abraham Liset published Amphithalami, or, The
Accomptants Closet, the first English book on DEB for estates.
This gives a worked example with a running commentary of the
ledger of a gentleman’s estates for the year ended 31 December
1658. Liset keeps accounts for two estates and two stewards. He
debits all property accounts with the capital value at 1 January
1658. He debits rents collected to the steward and credits the
property, and he makes opposite entries for disbursements and
expenditures. At the end of the year, Liset carries the opening
balance of the property forward and transfers the excess of rent
over disbursements to the gain and loss account [Lee, 1981, p.
544]. With such accounts it would be possible for the landlord to
calculate the feudal rate-of-return on his capital.
The first known example of DEB applied to estate accounts
are those of the Francis Willughby Executorship, 1672-1682
[Lee, 1981]. Sir Henry Barnard, the principal trustee, installed
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these accounts in 1673, possibly using Liset as a model. As ex-
ecutor, his interest was in financial control, so he did not value
the estates. Sir Henry kept the accounts on a cash basis, draw-
ing no distinctions between capital and revenue expenditures,
and he did not periodically balance them. To remedy these de-
fects, in 1676 Sir Henry “brought down . . . an Accomptant, so
that in a short time I hope to perfect all your accounts . . . ” [Lee,
1981, p. 545]. We know nothing of the provenance of this
Accomptant, Thomas Godfrey. Godfrey’s new system “provided
Sir Henry with a potent instrument of financial control over the
estates in his charge, far superior to any other then available, so
far as is known . . . ” [Lee, 1981, p. 548]. By valuing the estate
properties it would also have provided the means for calculating
the estate’s rate-of-return on capital.7
How do we explain this early application of DEB to estate
management? To Lee it “was the work of an obscure accountant
three centuries ago with few or no models to guide him and
with ‘generally accepted accounting principles’ more than two
centuries in the future”, the work of a “talented man” [1981, p.
548]. Thomas Godfrey as an individual might remain obscure,
but his social role and his models and accepted principles need
not. Although Godfrey called himself an Accomptant, this did
not have the traditional meaning — one who prepares charge
and discharge accounts [Lee, 1981, p. 545]. Godfrey’s title had
the modern meaning — one who provides the means (accounts)
to hold others accountable. He might be an early example of an
emerging profession of Accomptants. The English East India
Company hired ‘accountants’ from the early 17th century [Bryer,
2000b], and other joint stock companies are likely to have been
doing the same. The connection with socialized capital could
also explain Godfrey’s accounts. The “year 1676 was a crucial
one for the Willughby’s. Henry Barnard became a knight; Emma
[Willughby] became the third wife of Josiah Child (1603-1699),
one of the richest men in England”, and Godrey installed the
new accounting system. Josiah Child happened to be “a London
merchant, a director of the East India Company, and later its
Governor . . . ” [Lee, 1981, p. 548]. From 1677 “extensive invest-
ments were made under Sir Josiah Child’s influence in the stock
of the East India Company . . . ” [Lee, 1981, p. 549]. This is pre-
cisely the type of social milieu in which, according to Marx, the
7 Although Godfrey set up capital accounts each with “a unique set of assets
and liabilities . . . ” [Lee, 1981, p. 545] it is not clear whether these included more
than accumulated rents.
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rate-of-return mentality of socialized capital should be growing
towards the end of the 17th century.
A rate-of-return on capital mentality spreading within the
landed gentry could explain the steady flow of manuals of
double entry estate accounts from the reprint of Liset in 1684
[Lee, 1981, p. 544]. For example, Thomas Richard’s The
Gentleman’s Auditor [1707]; Roger North’s The Gentleman
Accomptant [1714]; Richard Hayes, The Gentlemen’s Complete
Book-keeper . . . [1741]; and Anon, The Gentleman’s and Lady’s
Accomptant [1744]. Roger North advocated and presented a so-
phisticated system of estate accounts based on DEB [Parker,
1997]. North had early experience of government in London, but
spent most of his life as a gentleman farmer and author in Nor-
folk. Roger’s brother was the well-known Dudley North, author
and merchant. North’s “emphasis, not only upon accountability,
but also on what he called ‘Managery’ . . . ” [Parker, 1997, p. 37],
is consistent with the increasing interpenetration of the mentali-
ties of socialized capital and capitalist agriculture. Parker says
“Richards presents charge and discharge in double-entry cloth-
ing . . . ” [1997, p. 37]. However, he says this only because “no
values are placed on the properties”, even though there is space
for the accountant to insert a capital value. An account existed
for “My Lord B’s Estate in general . . . ” [Parker, 1997, p. 37].
The “Estate in general”, is the Lord’s capital. Parker is right that
other books of the late 17th and even early 18th century used
charge and discharge or only cash receipts and payments, which
would support the view that the rate-of-return mentality was not
yet general. Consistent with this, Lee thinks DEB in estate ac-
counts “was probably not common before 1750 . . . ” [Lee, 1981,
p. 551]. Jones says from around 1750 we see a “transition from
the charge and discharge basis to double entry accounts, in-
tegrated the one with the other . . . ” [1985, p. 41]. A clear ex-
ample is the account books of Herbert Mackworth of Gnoll,
Glamorgan, for 1759-1760 [Jones, 1985, p. 53]. They give us
direct evidence of the capitalistic mentality at work. “Attempts
were made to measure the profitability o[f] various aspects of
work undertaken by the Estate with the object[ive] of indicating
overall profitability, thus giving the landlord an idea of what the
Estate could repay him on account of capital, or ‘principal’,
originally advanced or invested . . . ” [Jones, 1985, p. 53]. Not
surprisingly, according to Marx’s theory, Herbert Mackworth
and his son were very keen on improvement [Jenkins, 1983, p.
56]. Oldroyd finds the same attitude on the Bowes’ estates and
“unequivocal evidence of double-entry bookkeeping . . . [in] a
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pro-forma scheme of partnership accounts for lead mining and
smelting, compiled around 1741”, and evidence of its use be-
tween 1741 and 1746 [1999, pp. 182-183].
Landlords did not need DEB to calculate the rate-of-return
on capital; they could modify their well-understood single-entry
systems. Napier thinks it unlikely that landlords used their ac-
counts for this purpose because, for example, for the second
Marquis of Bute “to gain an overall picture of his Glamorgan
estate, he would have had to consolidate in his own mind ac-
counting and other information from several sources . . . ” [1991,
p. 171]. However, Bute did care about the rate-of-return on his
capital. In 1828 he “was advised that a new dock at Cardiff
would cost £66,000 and generate a return of 7% . . . ” [Napier,
1991, p. 166]. The accountant kept his mineral ledger using DEB
from 1826 to 1831 [Napier, 1991, p. 170]. The form of his Ac-
count Current and the Abstract for the estate “suggests that . . .
[the accountant] used a double entry ledger”, if only a “rudimen-
tary one” [Napier, 1991, p. 170]. There are many ways accoun-
tants could adapt charge and discharge systems [Baxter, 1980, p.
70]. Bailiffs’ accounts of farms in hand could provide examples
as “even during the eighteenth century [they] displayed a re-
markable similarity in presentation, in that annual profit and
loss columns and stock valuations were drawn up and farming
matters were clearly separated from other estate interests . . . ”
[Jones and Collins, 1965, p. 87]. Furthermore, the landlord or
his agents could use records of cash receipts and payments in a
variety of ways — adjusting for opening and closing debtors,
creditors and stocks — to measure and control profitability
[Oldroyd, 1999, pp. 182, 197].
The landlords’ adoption of the rate-of-return on capital
mentality is the first step. The following parts argue that from
around 1750 many landlords took the second step by becoming
capitalists and spreading its mentality and social relations
through enclosures, through capital investment, and their man-
agement of rent.
CAPITALIST LANDLORDS AND
PARLIAMENTARY ENCLOSURES
The flood of parliamentary enclosures beginning in the
1760s that swept away the open commonfields and commons
was a critical element in Marx’s landlords’ revolution. To see if
he is right we must examine the landlords’ and farmers’ motives.
Economic historians often misunderstand Marx’s views on
20
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enclosures. Allen repeats the dominant view. He says Marx
thought “[e]nclosures and large farms created private property
and capitalism . . . ” [1992, p. 2]. Marx has it the other way
around: capitalism created enclosures and large farms. Marx
saw capitalist enclosures not simply as a technically efficient
reorganization of the land, but, crucially, as arenas in which the
farmer would be accountable to the landlord for the capital em-
ployed. They “conquered the field for capitalistic agriculture,
made the soil part and parcel of capital . . . ” [Marx, 1974, p.
685]. They made land “suitable for the application of capital and
labour” [Marx, 1969a, p. 141]. They allowed the capitalist
farmer freedom to maximize the rate-of-return on capital. But,
more important for the landlord, enclosures legally and physi-
cally defined the boundaries of the capital for which he could
hold the farmer accountable. “Enclosure, whether by Parliamen-
tary act or local agreement operated to define and strengthen
the control of individuals over cultivable land . . . ” [O’Brien,
1977, p. 180]. After 1760 enclosures were the landlords’ largest
expenditure [Mingay, 1963b, p. 179; Holderness, 1988, p. 20].
Marx would have agreed that “the growth of capitalist farm-
ing . . . [was] fuelled by enclosure . . . ” [Turner, 1989, p. 58]. He
thought that capitalist landlords and farmers used enclosures to
increase labor productivity by innovation and investment to pro-
duce higher returns on capital and higher rents [Marx, 1974, p.
908]. Consistent with this, Allen shows that 18th century “open
villages were far less innovative than the enclosed” [1992, p. 15].
He finds, however, that these innovations made “only a minor
contribution” to increases in crop yields and labor productivity
[Allen, 1992, p. 15]. He concludes that Marx “exaggerated the
contribution of enclosure to the growth in labour productiv-
ity . . . ” [Allen, 1992, p. 151]. He thinks the major economic
consequence of enclosures “was to redistribute the existing agri-
cultural income, not to create additional income by raising effi-
ciency . . . ” [Allen, 1992, p. 181]. In support, Allen calculates the
farmers’ excess returns from open fields and from enclosures
using Ricardo’s theory of rent [1992, p. 174]:
sT = pQ - wL - iK
s = surplus per acre,
T = total acres,
p = the price of total output,
Q = total output,
w = the price of labor including that of the farmer and his
w = family,
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L = total labor hours,
i = the price of capital,
K = the farmer’s capital.
Allen measures Ricardian rent (sT) as sales (pQ) minus
wages, seeds, repairs and all other expenditures on labor, etc.,
(wL) and the “price” of capital (iK) (sT = pQ - wL - iK). His
“capital cost” “equals the depreciation plus the interest of live-
stock and implements, that is, the assets with lives longer than
one year”. He charges 5% only on the farmer’s livestock and
implements, the maximum rate of interest the law allowed
[Allen, 1992, Appendix II]. A major difference between Ricardo
and Marx’s theories of rent, therefore, is that according to Marx
the farmer wanted a return on all of his capital, on his produc-
tive capital and his capital of circulation (his inventories, debt-
ors and cash). Another is that, according to Marx, the farmer
“does not demand customary interest but the customary
profit . . . ” [1969b, p. 158], that is, the general rate of profit.8
If the landlord collected less rent than Ricardo’s theory pre-
dicts, the farmer kept an excess return. Allen finds that land-
lords generally collected Ricardian rent from enclosed farmers.
By contrast, they often failed to collect full Ricardian rents from
open field farmers [Allen, 1982, p. 941]. Allen concludes, there-
fore, that the aim and result of enclosures was to redistribute
surplus; an expression of the landlords’ increased power in the
18th century. In Marx’s terms, he sees enclosures and rent in-
creases as acts of feudal coercion with no revolutionary implica-
tions, “the . . . outcome of a power struggle . . . ” [Overton,
1996b, pp. 162-163]. What follows argues that enclosures pro-
vided the foundation for capitalist accountability: that they did
help landlords to eliminate the farmer’s excess returns, but not
through a power struggle over a given surplus. The landlords
used their remaining feudal power (their dominance of the land
and parliament) to impose capitalist accountability and control
over their tenants. Landlords could not appropriate full eco-
nomic surpluses from open-field farms as there were limits to
their feudal power. To control these surpluses and generate
more, landlords had to transform feudal into capitalist account-
ability. Enclosure was the first essential step, but it was not
sufficient to produce an increase in output and productivity.
Unlike Allen, Marx envisaged no simple enclosure effect — no
8 I critically examine the Ricardian theory of rent in a later section. For the
remainder of this section I take Allen’s empirical results at face value.
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increase in productivity or yields from simply putting up fences,
etc.
An Enclosure Effect?: Enclosed farmers could innovate because
enclosures removed collective constraints on the farmer’s deci-
sions, but why they should is a mystery in Allen’s explanation as
the landlord diverts any excess return to himself. According to
Marx, enclosed farmers innovate because they are accountable
to a capitalist landlord and engage in the real subsumption of
labor to maximize their returns on the largest possible capital.
Arthur Young “strongly believed that the character of the farm-
ers of enclosed lands was quite different from that of the occupi-
ers of the open fields”. He thought the “farmers using enclosures
were more progressive in their ideas, more open to the possibil-
ity of increasing output by adopting improved practice” (quoted
in Mingay, 1975, p. 103]. The reason was that “[e]nclosures raise
rents; high rents made men industrious . . . . Everything must be
turned to good advantage when high rents are paid; the farmer
knows that everything must be profitable; and that very circum-
stance renders them so . . . ” [Young, quoted in Mingay, 1975, p.
104]. Anticipating the ‘results control’ approach of modern man-
agement control theorists [Bryer, 2004c], Young claimed that by
holding tenants accountable for high rents, “[m]en have been
taught to think . . . ” [quoted in Mingay, 1975, p. 111]. Certainly,
as land agent Thomas Davis commented of Wiltshire in 1811,
‘[e]nclosures make a good farmer better and a bad one worse’.
Clearly, “enclosure could bring improvement only if the farmers
were ready and willing to innovate . . . ” [Beckett, 1990, p. 39] —
only if they had the appropriate mentality. Enclosures in them-
selves raised neither labor productivity nor yields; in themselves
they played no role [Turner, 1986, p. 687].
Allen, by contrast, looks for an enclosure effect on yields,
and concludes that we must, therefore, control for the effect of
soil and climate, etc. [1992, p. 135]. He controls for soil type and
finds that increased yields from enclosures were insignificant. At
the national level using 1801 crop returns, Turner, however,
finds “the increase in yield that can be postulated as a result of
enclosure were 23% for wheat and barely and 11% for oats . . . ”
[1989, p. 53]. The increase for Northamptonshire “can partly be
attributed to inferior land having been taken out of crop produc-
tion, which necessarily raises the statistical average . . . ”
[Turner, 1989, p. 53]. From Allen’s perspective, Turner’s study
was flawed [Allen, 1994, p. 116]. However, shifting corn pro-
duction to more fertile land after enclosure is a “result of
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enclosure”, the result of applying the capitalist mentality to the
opportunities it created. Therefore, Turner’s increases in yields
give us a better guide to the motives for enclosure than Allen’s.
Only by relying on arbitrary quantitative criteria for deciding
whether changes were ‘revolutionary’ can Allen conclude that
neither productivity nor yield increases were significant because
he finds greater increases during the 17th century. The increases
he finds insignificant might have been significant to the land-
lord and the farmer. We cannot understand enclosures by study-
ing crop yields and productivity in isolation from changing pat-
terns of farming and output [Turner, 1989, p. 53], and to
understand this we must understand the mentality behind them.
If the promoters were capitalists, even apparently small in-
creases in yields and labor productivity in conjunction with
smaller capital per acre [Allen, 1992, p. 18] might have given the
larger enclosed farms significantly greater returns on capital
and, therefore, their landlords greater rents. Did landlords pro-
mote enclosures for these reasons? Was it the case that “from a
landlord’s point of view enclosure was an investment, the profit
from which was a higher rent . . . ” [Turner, 1984, p. 41]? “Were
accountancy procedures, however crude, employed? . . . ”
[Turner, 1984, p. 44]. From Marx’s viewpoint, we must ask
whether enclosers calculated the expected return on the capital
employed. Although we need systematic research, the evidence
available supports the view that many did, using either rate-of-
return, residual income, or present value calculations.
Parliamentary Enclosures, Accounting Calculations and Class
Conflict: In their extensive studies of parliamentary enclosures,
historians only occasionally give us evidence of accounting and
financial calculations, although they often imply they were not
unusual. In 1775 Nathaniel Kent (a Norfolk land steward)
thought that “if an acquisition would contribute towards mak-
ing possible an enclosure or some other rationalization of farm
layout, then it would be worthwhile as an investment . . . be-
cause [of] the high rate of return obtainable from capital . . . ”
[quoted in Clay, 1985, p. 181]. Turner says that some “evidence
suggests that enclosers were sensitive to opportunity costs, in-
voking the capital cost of enclosure only in terms of the fore-
gone income from investing the same money elsewhere . . . ”
[1984, p. 45]. He gives an example from 1775 when the principal
landowner in the Buckinghamshire hamlet of Sedrup calculated
residual income [Turner, 1984, p. 45]. Turner says of this type of
calculation, “while not commonplace, . . . it was not unusual for
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recognized enclosure commissioners and land surveyors to
make this kind of estimate as a preliminary to framing a
bill . . . ” [1984, p. 45]. Sometime in the 1770s Sir William Lee of
Hartwell in Buckinghamshire made a present value calculation
to evaluate an enclosure proposal [Turner, 1984, p. 45]. Land-
lords sometimes calculated the number of years before the rent
increase repaid the capital. The rent increase on enclosure gave
a constant surplus each period, so the reciprocal of the payback
period was the rate-of-return on the initial capital. As the
Sedrup enclosure’s forecast rent increase would have repaid the
capital after three years [Turner, 1984, p. 45], its rate-of-return
was 331/3%. Widespread concern with the rate-of-return on capi-
tal from 1750 could explain why neither price levels nor interest
rates provides a convincing explanation of enclosure activity
[Turner, 1984, p. 51]. If landlords were capitalists they based
their decisions to enclose on the expected rate-of-return that
was a function of expected interest rates and profits.
Acceptance of the capitalist mentality could also explain
why, although rents increased markedly on enclosure, and often
redistributed surplus from tenant to landlord, no serious con-
flict erupted between them. Why, that is, the “tension between
the . . . ideals . . . of paternalistic responsibility for their tenants
. . . [and] the apparent advantages of active, engaged manage-
ment, of improvement . . . probably lessened towards the end of
the seventeenth century . . . ” [Heal and Holmes, 1994, p. 113].
Feudal paternalistic responsibility for tenants meant physical
capital maintenance, that tenants should not be ‘wasted’ [Bryer,
1994b]. In the capitalist mentality it means the tenant earns the
general rate of profit on his capital. Certainly, there was conflict
between landlords and peasants, particularly the smaller farm-
ers and below that had most to lose. Marx, however, would have
agreed “[l]andlords and tenants shared a common interest, but
the ultimate benefit of any improvement went to the land-
lord . . . ” [Turner, 1989, p. 57]. The landlord got the maximum
rate of rent and the farmer got the general rate of profit on the
largest capital. If the equation Ri = riKTi - rGKFi governed rents,
they could double on enclosure (as the conventional wisdom
says they did) if the rate-of-return on total farm capital in-
creased modestly and the farmer took the general rate of profit.
All this could happen without a power struggle between the
two groups. According to Young, enclosed farmers got a lower
rate-of-return on capital than open-field farmers [Allen, 1982, p.
941]. However, if enclosed farmers employed a larger capital
they could earn the same or a larger profit. For example, assume
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before enclosure that the rate-of-return on the total capital of
£100 invested in the farm is 15% and the farmer brings capital
of £50 and takes the general rate of profit of 10%. The rent is
£10 = [0.15 x £100] - [0.10 x £50], and the farmer’s profit is £5.
If, after enclosure, the rate of profit on the farm increased to
16.67%, and the capital employed after enclosure was £150 and
the general rate of profit stayed the same, rent would double to
£20 = [0.1667 x £150] - [0.10 x £50]. If before enclosure the
farmer took (say) a 12% return on his capital so that rent was
£9, conflict could ensue over the redistribution of £1 of surplus.
However, the farmer’s income could stay the same or rise if, as
often was the case, enclosure allowed him to employ a larger
capital [Allen, 1994, p. 98; Overton, 1996b, p. 127]. If in the
example the farmer could invest an additional £10, his profit
stayed at £6, and rent increased to £20.67. Perhaps this is why
initiatives for enclosure “[o]ften . . . came from the larger farm-
ers who desired more compact and easily-worked farms”
[Mingay, 1963b, p. 181] on which they could employ more work-
ing capital, particularly higher densities of livestock [Turner,
1989, p. 50]. This switch continued through the early 19th cen-
tury despite a shift of relative prices favoring grain production.
From 1700 to 1850 the farmers’ capital increased as they ex-
panded flocks and livestock to take advantage of improved pas-
tures and greater production of winter forage [Allen, 1994, p.
117]. This could help explain why farmers benefited, but by less
than landlords, from enclosures [Turner, 1984, p. 44].
Enclosures and Accountability: Allen’s finding that in the late
1760s rents gave enclosed farmers no excess returns but that
open field rents did, is consistent, as Boyer says, with “landlords
learn[ing] how to properly value land only upon its enclo-
sure . . . ” [1993, p. 919]. That is, according to Marx, learning
how to make modern accounting calculations. Allen does not
otherwise explain “why convention was so much better at set-
ting rents on enclosed land than on open-field land . . . ” [Boyer,
1993, p. 919]. Marx’s theory says that whereas from around 1670
growing numbers of farmers could do capitalist accounting,
landlords only became capitalists from around 1750 and learnt
it then. This suggests that until then, open field tenants kept
some or all the surpluses because landlords had neither the
mentality to demand capitalist accountability, nor the systems
and manpower to enforce it. By contrast, Turner, Beckett and
Afton argue that landlords did not claw back surpluses because
they became better at “identifying and extracting the value of
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their shared asset . . . ” [1996, p. 16]. In their view, this happened
because “changes in the economic environment of eighteenth-
century farming initially worked in favour of the tenants, and
that advantage was halted, and to a large degree reversed, at
enclosure . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1996, pp. 234-235].
However, this explanation takes no account of Allen’s find-
ing that by 1806 the gap between rent and surplus on open-field
farms had disappeared. Allen does not explain why open-field
rents captured the full Ricardian rent during the inflation of the
French war years but did not during the 1760s. “[I]f the open-
fields market was in equilibrium in 1806, what does that imply
about the causes of the enormous wave of enclosures at that
time? . . . ” [Boyer, 1993, p. 920]. According to Allen, landlords
enclosed to get the Ricardian surplus. However, they had no
need to enclose in the early 19th century if open-field rents
already transmitted this surplus. By contrast, Marx’s theory ex-
plains these enclosures as the result of spreading demand for
capitalist accountability. That is, the landlord’s motive became
not simply to increase his rents to collect his Ricardian surplus,
nor simply to get increased rents through immediate increases
in productivity. Rather, landlords enclosed to secure capitalist
accountability from their tenants to increase the long run rate-
of-return on the capital employed on their land. Landlords and
farmers, like most political economists, thought that increased
rent was a return for increased efficiency (i.e., was differential
rent), and saw enclosures as the beginning of a program of capi-
tal investment to increase it. As Edward Laurence, the well-
known writer and land steward put it, the improving landlord
“should not immediately think that All is to be set right on a
sudden; but Time and Patience must be allow’d and then some-
thing may be done to Satisfaction. . . . In all . . . cases, a Sum of
Money must be allow’d and expended to make good Deficien-
cies; and this before the Landlord can, or ought, so much as to
think of, an Advance of Rent . . . ” [1731, pp. 2-3].
If landlords judged enclosures and other improvements by
differential rent, what type of rent, Ricardo or Marx’s? It is true
that “we know all too little about how rents were assessed, the
process of agreement between tenant and agent, the methods of
payment and accounting, and the techniques for agreeing abate-
ments, remissions and . . . evictions” etc., [Turner, Beckett and
Afton, 1997, pp. 6-7]. Marx and Ricardo’s theories of rent pro-
duce very different views of how landlords set about managing
their estates. However, only Marx’s theory is consistent with
modern accounting and the evidence we have of its use.
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RICARDO OR MARX’S THEORY OF RENT?
Ricardo recognizes only circulating and fixed capital, and so
does Allen. Ricardo says that “[a]ccording as capital is rapidly
perishable, and requires to be frequently reproduced, or is slow
of consumption, it is classed under the heading of circulating or
of fixed . . . ” [1973, p. 26]. The modern notion of fixed capital
does not depend on its durability. Thinking that it does wrongly
focuses attention on the physical properties of the asset and not
its economic function in the production process [Marx, 1978, p.
298]. The essential point is whether the owner recovers the capi-
tal bit-by-bit over more than one operating cycle. In Marx and
modern accounting the distinction between fixed capital and
circulating capital is not immutable. They are not, as they are in
Ricardo, “a set of definitions under which things are to be sub-
sumed . . . ” [Marx, 1978, p. 303]. Ricardo thought certain ob-
jects the capitalist buys are by their nature fixed and others are
circulating. Modern accountants would agree with Marx that it
is “rather definite functions that are expressed in specific cat-
egories . . . ” [1978, p. 303]; that the functions and categories of
fixed capital are as follows. As labor uses the fixed capital it
transfers the capital’s value to the commodity. Accountants call
the consumption and recovery of this capital depreciation. This
value becomes, first, an element of productive capital as work-
in-progress; then it becomes capital of circulation as finished
stock, debtors or cash, etc. [Bryer, 1999a].
Ricardo ignored these elements of the farmer’s capital of
circulation. His equation for rent simply divides the cash flows
of the farm between the landlord and the farmer (who keeps the
cash flow shielded by ‘depreciation’). Perhaps this is why Allen
confidently claims that rents, having little to do with account-
ing, “were determined administratively or bargained between
landlord and tenant” using “conventions” (for example, open
fields rents were 10s. per acre, and enclosed were 20s.) [Allen,
1992, p. 181]. Furthermore, following Pollard [1965], he claims
that neither landlord nor farmer “could . . . do the requisite ac-
counting . . . ” [Allen, 1992, p. 183]. Pollard’s key claim was that
leading industrial concerns did not attempt calculations of the
“profit rate on capital” but, as Edwards and Newell say, he “is
certainly wrong” [1991, p. 51].
If we include the use of residual income accounting, there is
evidence that some farmers did calculate the rate-of-return on
capital employed [Bryer, 2004a]. In 1611 Robert Loder calcu-
lated his excess profit on the capital he employed in production
[Bryer, 2000b]. In 1765 a Romney Marsh grazier deducted “1 yrs
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Interest on £560 money advanced on the stock @ 4 per cent”
from his surplus [Reading University Library, KEN 19/1/1, p. 5].
In 1788 Arthur Young published accounts that measured re-
sidual income and calculated the rate-of-return on the “Total
stock of the farm, or capital employed . . . ” [1788, p. 236]. Allen
accepts that 18th century entrepreneurs often used the residual
income approach, although he confuses it with his ‘opportunity
cost of capital’. That is, he says they “typically allowed 5 per cent
interest on the investment and computed the rate of profit on
the residual . . . ” [Allen, 1992, p. 183]. Allen says “Young . . .
used this value in calculations of farm profits . . . ” [1992, p.
319]. In reality, Young used it as a benchmark for calculating
the excess profit over ‘interest’ as a benchmark rate-of-return. In
the 18th century entrepreneurs and farmers considered any ex-
cess the return to entrepreneurship [Hueckel, 1976, pp. 334-
335].
Were the Agricultural Experts Ricardians?: To bolster his argu-
ment that farmers and landlords set rents innocent of modern
accounting, Allen refers to the widely quoted essay by Tuckett
On Land Valuing published in 1863. Allen claims Tuckett as a
Ricardian because he says “there can be no doubt that the dif-
ference between the produce and the expenses must, in the end,
regulate the rent that a farmer can afford to pay . . . ” [quoted by
Allen, 1992, p. 182]. It is not clear from this that Tuckett is a
Ricardian. Tuckett quotes with qualified approval the “same
idea” that “the fair rent, ‘it is presumed, may be obtained by
estimating the expenses incurred and the profits arising during
the whole course of one rotation of crops on different soils’ . . . ”
[1863, p. 5]. His qualification is that in estimating profits, “to
enter on these needful calculations” over one rotation “will re-
quire great practical experience . . . ” [1863, p. 6]. Tuckett did,
therefore, think it was possible and desirable to estimate “prof-
its” in determining rent. There was no mechanical formula, but
Tuckett clearly thought that the boundary of rent was “profit”
which the land surveyor should estimate as best he could.
Tuckett found “[s]uch calculations . . . very interesting, and I
have often made them for my own satisfaction . . . ” [1863, p. 6].
They should, however, be supplemented by an intimate knowl-
edge of the rent market to gauge the ‘fair’ level of rent. Accord-
ing to Marx, this was the rent that left the farmer with the
general rate of profit on his capital.
Young, Marshall and other experts appear to have had this
formula in mind. Marshall thought, “a proprietor should spare
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no reasonable expense to come at a fair rental value . . . ”
[quoted in Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997, p. 17]. He should
use two or three valuers and, presumably, average their valua-
tions to arrive at his forecast. Alternatively, he should use local
market price, the summation of all money-backed forecasts: “in
every neighbourhood, there is a peculiar, yet fair Market
Price . . . ” [Marshall, quoted in Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997,
p. 17]. This is what Squarey meant in 1878 when he said that no
“precise formula can be adopted in fixing its amount . . . ” [1878,
p. 441]. The reason was that in the real world the “rent of land is
that surplus of money which on an average of years, may be
expected to remain after paying the fixed and fluctuating
charges . . . ” [Squarey, 1878, p. 440]. Turner, Beckett and Afton
think Young’s “more sharply defined capitalist attitude” towards
setting rents looks Ricardian [Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997,
pp. 19-20]. Given Young’s capitalist understanding of accounts,
however, his attitude looks Marxist. For example, his view that
the landlord should include in his calculation of rent estimates
of the cost of carriage to market. “[The] goodness of roads, and
a moderate distance from market, are circumstances highly nec-
essary to be attended to in the hiring of a farm; and that, if they
are wanting, the rent ought to be estimated accordingly . . . ”
[quoted in Mingay, 1975, p. 158]. Put another way, the “general
rule, in the words of David Low [in 1823], was ‘that the landlord
so regulate his demands on the tenant, as not to exact as rent
any part of that fund which is necessary to the farmer as capi-
tal’ . . . ” [Beckett, 1989, p. 610]. This, for Marx, typified the capi-
talist mentality.
Capitalist landlords should seek the highest rent consistent
with maintaining the farmer’s capital, for example, by reducing
rent in response to improvements paid for by the tenant, or
because of hard times. This principle underlay the system of
‘rack renting’ approved of by agricultural experts and practiced,
for example, by Coke of Norfolk [Turner, Beckett and Afton,
1997, p. 14]. In this context ‘rack’ has two meanings — a ‘hori-
zontal bar’ or ‘shelf’, and to ‘stretch the joints (of a person) by
tugging or pulling’. A rack rent, therefore, was a high, level rent,
unlike earlier forms (mainly beneficial leases and copyholds)
that had the tenant pay a large lump sum followed by a nominal
rent and, perhaps, feudal services in money, labor or kind. A
step towards rack rents was the recognition, beginning in the
17th century, that with beneficial leases the amount the tenant
paid in advance was the present value of the nominal fine
[Finch, 1956, p. 202]. The landlord calculated the fine as so
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many years depending on the rate of interest multiplied by the
difference between the economic rent and the nominal rent
[Stone, 1965, p. 318]. Financial tables existed in the early 17th
century to convert fines into equal annual equivalents, that is,
the equivalent annuity [Finch, 1956, Appendix II, p. 173].
Turner, Beckett and Afton say in practice the fine “was rarely
based on real economic information . . . ” [1997, p. 25]. They
think that only a few “farmers were sufficiently wealthy and
educated to think in this way — the majority kept no records let
alone understood the finer details of accountancy”, but they ad-
mit that David Low’s clearly capitalist “way of thinking was well
established . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997, p. 20]. Sir
Ralph Verney’s management of his tenants suggests this way of
thinking also existed in the late 17th century.
Sir Ralph Verney, An Early Capitalist Landlord?: “Sir Ralph’s goal
throughout his life” was “the highest possible rent . . . ” [Broad,
1973, p. 249]. Broad says Sir Ralph reveals his “capitalist view of
the landowner’s position” when he says “I ever was and still am
of the opinion that no man is bound to suffer his tenants to reap
the benefits of his land because they are poor . . . ” [1973, p.
248]. In short, Broad thinks Sir Ralph is a capitalist because he
is “grasping” and “harsh” [1973, p. 213]. However, Sir Ralph
also said, possibly revealing his truly capitalist view, “on the
other side I do believe a landlord is obliged to take but an equi-
table rent for his land so as the tenant by God’s ordinary provi-
dence and blessing upon his honest endeavors may be a gainer
by it. And to my knowledge I never broke this rule . . . ” [quoted
in Broad, 1973, p. 248]. The capitalist rule is that equitable rent
leaves the tenant with the general rate of profit on his capital. A
landlord like Sir Ralph, deeply involved in the personal manage-
ment of his business and knowing the markets well, could with
equanimity leave the calculation of the equitable rent to the
market. Broad says that for Sir Ralph, “[a]s in the true defini-
tion of rack rent, market forces alone determined the level . . . ”
[1973, p. 248].
However, this does not necessarily mean that Sir Ralph was
not a consciously active capitalist landlord. He almost certainly
had a rate-of-return mentality. As a Royalist Sir Ralph had to
sell two-thirds of his pre-civil-war estates, but stabilized his fi-
nancial position by marrying his eldest son to the heiress of a
City merchant whose family had recently settled on the land
[Broad, 1973, p. 7]. He immersed himself in the City, spending
around five months in London every year, and his younger son
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became a successful Levant merchant in the 1650s. He had a
wide circle of friends and contacts, including the Earl of
Warwick and other prominent merchants trading with social-
ized capitals in the West Indies and North America, all vigorous
investors in the East India Company and elsewhere [Brenner,
1993, Bryer, 2000b]. Although Sir Ralph “did not normally in-
vest in commercial enterprises he once put £150 in Africa
Company stock. However, one of the services which he provided
was to arrange the putting out of money for friends and
relatives . . . ” [Broad, 1973, p. 8]. Sir Ralph usually reinvested
the money by lending to landed families, but in 1678 he at-
tempted unsuccessfully to invest £800 in East India stock
through his son John for a friend [Broad, 1973, p. 9]. Clay says,
the “injection of mercantile wealth greatly revived the fortunes
of the Verneys . . . ” [1985, p. 152]. However, their involvement
with mercantile wealth might also have had profound effects on
their mentalities as farmers and landlords. Although Sir Ralph
did little farming himself, only becoming involved when he
could not let particular farms, he was an improving landlord
[Broad, 1973, p. 246].
Broad says that Sir Ralph’s approach to enclosures and im-
provements “was very much in line with the best contemporary
thought on the subject as laid down rather late by Edward
Laurence . . . ” [1973, p. 246]. Laurence published his The Duty
and Office of a Land Steward in 1727, based, he says, on “above
Twenty Years” experience [1731, p. ix]. However, Broad says
that where “Sir Ralph was very much at odds with Laurence’s
idea of good administration was in his basic attitude to his ten-
ants and his consistent insistence on rack renting . . . ” [1973, p.
247]. Arguably, however, while Sir Ralph and Laurence’s land-
lords used different methods, their “basic attitudes” were the
same. Broad does not discuss Laurence’s views, but if they were
a late presentation of the best practice of many landlords in his
day, they were capitalists, just like Sir Ralph. Certainly, Sir
Ralph appears “harsh” in keeping rents as high as possible and
evicting tenants in arrears of more than one year “unless they
had reserves of capital . . . ” [Broad, 1973, p. 252]. Laurence’s
aim was that estates were “let to the Satisfaction of both Land-
lord and Tenant, . . . [f]or altho’ the Lord’s Estate ought to be let
at best advantage, yet it should be let without racking the indus-
trious Tenant . . . ” [1731, p. 84]. Although their methods appear
to be different, by “racking” Laurence means, just like Sir Ralph,
charging rents no higher than an industrious tenant could pay
and earn a “profitable return . . . ” [Laurence, 1731, p. 14].
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Sir Ralph did his energetic best to avoid setting rents too
high by keeping a close watch on the efficiency and capital re-
serves of those who found his rents hard to bear. He tried to
keep potential tenants in reserve, and, when all else failed, even
“Sir Ralph could not avoid reducing his rents . . . ” [Broad, 1973,
p. 252]. Certainly, it would be risky for a “Person of Quality at a
distance” to entrust this method of management to his land
steward who might set his rents too high for a short term advan-
tage to himself (e.g., higher salary) and long term disadvantage
to the Lord. For Lords at a distance, Laurence recommended
formal calculations: “a Steward . . . , should take his Pen in
hand, and make a Calculation with the Tenant . . . of what may
be sold off the Farm, which ought to be . . . at least two Rents, if
it is intended a Farmer should thrive; and thrive he must, or else
the Landlord will suffer first or last. By these Methods and fair
Calculations a Farmer is treated in familiar, easy way, and you
beat, or rather convict, him with his own Weapons. But he will
not be bully’d or hector’d into an advanc’d Rent . . . ” [1731, p.
19]. Here Laurence contrasts the feudal landlord who bullies his
tenants to pay high rents with the capitalist Lord that has his
steward make calculations and talk to his tenants in their lan-
guage — the language of markets and accounting. Sir Ralph
apparently talked mainly of markets, but he was, unlike Sir
Pexall Brocas of Steventon, Hampshire (for example) no bully.
“Brocas’s ‘hard usage’ of his tenants was legendary: demands for
extortionate rents, and for loans that usually proved permanent,
were backed by threats of vexatious lawsuits and the attention
of his thugs . . . ” [Heal and Holmes, 1994, p. 115]. Laurence’s,
by contrast, was the modern way, “not the violent one of forcing
. . . tenants . . . beyond their Power, but the gentle and rational
one of persuading, and instructing them . . . that they may be
able, not only to pay, but to advance their Rents . . . ” [1731, p.
5].
Laurence gives us no details of how to calculate his ‘two
rents’, that is, rent for the landlord and profit for the farmer.
However, he says that stewards should lease to a “careful and
provident Farmer . . . [who] keeps well his Accompts, and wisely
balanceth his Gain and Loss, if he would be assur’d that he gets
by his Farm, and thrives in the world . . . ” [Laurence, 1731, pp.
82-83]. He should also be concerned with the tenant’s capital:
the “Steward, before he lets any considerable Farm to seeming-
good Advantage of an advanc’d Rent, should be well satisfied of
the Ability of the Tenant . . . . A Farm of a Hundred pounds a
year requires at the least Three hundred pounds Stock; and if ’tis
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a grazing Farm, above Four Hundred pounds . . . ” [Lawrence,
1731, p. 127]. This implies the tenant farmer wanted a particular
return on his capital, and the steward should calculate if an
industrious farmer could achieve this. Perhaps this is why
Laurence thought increasing all rents by the same amount was
“unjust” [1731, p. 17], presumably because farms needing the
least improvement should get the highest rent increase because
their rate-of-return on capital was higher?
Rack-renting and Farmers’ Returns on Capital: Beneficial leases
survived in certain areas as late as the end of the 19th century,
but from around 1750 landlords increasingly imposed rack
rents. Turner, Beckett and Afton say that even in the 19th cen-
tury the landlord tempered the “fully articulated ‘rack’ rent” with
“conventions based on social position” because “landlords were
often reluctant to push rents up to the highest possible lev-
els . . . ” [1997, pp. 13-15]. Certainly, rack rents “reflected a de-
sire to assume [more] direct control of their estates”, as did
using more tightly drawn lease contracts, the employment of
professional stewards, and the introduction of DEB [Turner,
Beckett and Afton, 1997, p. 15], but these trend are consistent
with Marx’s landlords’ revolution. Also consistent is Hueckel’s
finding that “the long-run equilibrium return to [the farmer’s]
capital over this period probably lay within the range from 9%
to 14% . . . ” [1976, p. 343], approximating the general rate of
profit, which implies that landlords also received ‘fair rents’. In
other words, as capitalists the landlords did push rents to the
‘highest possible levels’ consistent with their ‘social position’. To
what extent did this range result from market forces or the land-
lords’ and tenants’ calculations? According to Allen, if early in-
dustrialists did not understand accounting, the “average farmer”
certainly could not [1992, p. 183]. However, at least some land-
lords and agents did understand capitalist accounting and ac-
countability.
An ideal-typical capitalist landlord’s accounting system
came from the pen of Thomas Lovett, chief agent at Chirk Castle
after 1750. Lovett prepared model accounts for a 400-acre farm.
He starts by calculating the necessary capital, which he reckons
as £1279.14.0. “Now I want to know what profits may be reason-
ably expected from the circulation of this large capital in the
business of Farming . . . ” [quoted in Jones, 1985, pp. 67-68].
Just like a modern capitalist he expects profit from the circula-
tion of capital in production and, to confirm this, in calculating
his profit Lovett deducts “[w]ear and tear in the implements of
34
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 31 [2004], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol31/iss1/2
35Bryer: The Roots of Modern Capitalism
husbandry . . . and the decay in dairy utensils . . . ” [quoted in
Jones, 1985, p. 68]. Lovett then deducts “[t]he interest on his
neat Stock and neat Cash laid out . . . after the rate of £10 per
cent” [quoted in Jones, 1985, p. 68], to calculate his residual
income. Like a modern capitalist he “distinguishes . . . between
revenue and capital and recognises that certain types of ‘capital’
wear out or fall by the wayside and have to be replaced . . . to
maintain his starting capital intact . . . ” [Jones, 1985, p. 72].
Historians have studied only a few leading landlords’ ac-
counts in any detail, and fully supported generalizations must
await systematic research by accounting historians. The follow-
ing part highlights two prime examples where we have some
relevant accounting details, although questions remain. One ex-
ample is Thomas William Coke (‘Coke of Norfolk’) who appears
as an ideal-typical capitalist landlord, a man peculiarly fitted for
his times and for his self-appointed role as promoter of im-
proved agriculture. He was an incurable enthusiast and self-
publicist, not beyond distorting the facts to show himself in the
best possible light [Parker, 1975]. He and the early agricultural
historians, who took him at his word, magnified and distorted
his role in the agricultural revolution. Nevertheless, Coke of
Norfolk and his predecessors are an important test of Marx’s
theory: “the very fact that Cokes management was set up as an
example for others to follow makes . . . his study worth-
while . . . ” [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 249]. Given that in north
west Norfolk “there were excellent farmers, deploying large capi-
tal, holding Coke farms before Thomas William Coke succeeded
his father” [Parker, 1975, p. 73], the Coke’s appear a classic case
of capitalist farmers producing capitalist landlords. Consistent
with this, the Cokes’ improving leases kept up with, but did not
lead, their progressive tenants [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 76]. Tho-
mas Coke was subject to capitalistic influences. Following their
disaster with the South Sea Bubble, the Cokes never seriously
invested outside agriculture until the 1850s, but they borrowed
heavily [Parker, 1975; Wade Martins, 1980].
Another prominent example is George Granville who inher-
ited the Leveson-Gower estates in 1803 [Wordie, 1982]. With the
estate and title he also inherited the capitalistic mentality of its
agents who, from 1758, had “brought in a new commercial atti-
tude . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, p. 48]. From this time “the estate had
steadily come to be regarded more and more as first and fore-
most an investment, which gave a good or bad return in accor-
dance with the efficiency of the management . . . ” [Wordie,
1982, p. 59]. As we shall see, the evidence supports the view that
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by the 1790s the Leveson-Gower estates had a capitalist chief-
agent, and in 1803 they had a capitalist Lord (George Granville,
the second Earl Gower, was Marquis of Stafford from 1786, and
Duke of Sutherland from 1833). In the early 18th century the
Leveson-Gowers were in debt. From 1750 they were investing in
industrial partnerships and lending money to turnpike and ca-
nals.
Capitalist influence also comes from early industrial capital-
ists [Wordie, 1982, p. 107]. Not only did these entrepreneurs
draw the landlord’s attention to his unexploited mineral wealth,
they drew in his money [Wordie, 1982, pp. 107-108]. Regardless
of the landlord’s intentions this money circulated as capital.
From around 1750, the management of the Leveson-Gower es-
tates changed from what had been a “permissive”, haphazard
involvement, to “direct landlord participation” in industrial and
agricultural development [Wordie, 1982, p. 112]. The following
examines Cokes’, Leveson-Gowers’, and others’ capital calcula-
tions; their focus on the rate of rent; their calculations of the
length of leases, the capital adequacy of tenants, and the appro-
priate size of their farms. It concludes that the accounting evi-
dence supports Marx’s view that the motivation for the direct
involvement of landlords was their capitalist mentality.
CAPITALIST LANDLORDS AND
THE MANAGEMENT OF RENT
Thomas Coke’s guardians took control of the estate in 1707.
In 1708 they reviewed the rents and put them up, starting a
trend that continued until after the Napoleonic Wars [Parker,
1975, p. 4]. In 1717, just before Thomas came of age, the guard-
ians produced a table showing how much the rental of the es-
tates had increased, and how much of this was due better “man-
agement” [Parker, 1975, p. 5]. Parker states the nub of the
management problem for capitalist landlords in his summary of
the principles the guardians applied “to assess accurately the
potentialities of the land, to encourage the tenants to attain
them and to secure a rent correctly reflecting those potentiali-
ties. Too low a rent reduces the landlord’s income, too high a
rent forces farmers to mismanage their farms and harm the
land . . . ” [1975, pp. 5-6]. In Marx’s theory, the “potentialities of
the land” is the potential rate of profit on the farm. Too low a
rent means the farmer gets more than the general rate of profit
on his capital, and too high a rent means the farmer fails to
maintain his capital. Coke’s steward applied these principles in
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1824 when he severely criticized a tenant who sub-leased for
adopting the feudal approach to the management of rent: “he
has squeezed exorbitant rents out of the Tenants, so as to inca-
pacitate them from effecting necessary improvements . . . ”
[quoted in Parker, 1975, p. 177]. “Encouragement” of the ten-
ants meant the landlord helping or fully financing investment
and regulating his demands for rent. Thus, we must not assume
that when Coke allows rent arrears to build up or reduces rents,
as his land steward put it, “from his innate goodness of
heart . . . ” [Parker, 1975, p. 149], that he is simply searching for
social prestige. Coke and his agents knew that to get his rents
the farmer must have enough capital to efficiently run his farms.
He therefore only let to “good men . . . possessed of good capi-
tal . . . ” [Parker, 1975, p. 15]. That is, those “greater capitalists”
who were more likely to continue paying rents even if from
accumulated wealth [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 89]. However, to
encourage them Coke made capital investment in his tenants’
farms based on capital calculations.
Capital Calculations: A capitalist landlord will increase rents to
recover the capital he invests in a farm and give him the farm’s
rate of profit on the capital. At the very least, he will want an
‘interest’ return on his capital. For example, in 1711 Coke’s
guardians increased the rent by £10 a year to a tenant “for the
interest of £200 laid out in building a barne and which is to
remain an improved rent . . . ” [Parker, 1975, p. 8]. As part of
their management of Coke’s estates the guardians decided to
encourage tenants by bearing some or all the costs of marling.
They did this by allowing deductions from rents. For example,
from 1710 to 1715 John Carr of Massingham “marled by agree-
ment 240 acres, and was allowed 8s. an acre in return . . . ”
[Parker, 1975, p. 7, see also p. 41]. An indication of the type of
thinking that might have gone into these calculations is Blaikie’s
(Coke’s steward) claim in 1828 that improvements “on Arable
land may pay £10 p. Cent on Capital, under particularly favor-
able circumstances. Improvements on Grass land, especially
draining wet land may and generally will pay from £50 to £100
p.Cent on Capital expended . . . ” [quoted in Parker, 1975, p. 155,
fn.70]. In 1850 Coke’s land steward “introduced new clauses into
his leases whereby the estate was ensured a return on improve-
ments made to farms: 5% was charged for drainage work and
71⁄2% on the cost of building work . . . ” [Wade Martins, 1980, p.
100]. Coke of Norfolk spent a great deal on farm buildings.
Consistent with a capitalist mentality, as Young said of them,
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“the great object [was] to prevent waste and save labour . . . ”
[quoted in Wade Martins, 1980, p. 143]. The question remains
whether the greater object was to maximize the rate-of-return
on the capital employed. Evidence supporting this is the careful
provision of “adequate implement sheds, as more wear and tear
was caused by implements by leaving them outside than
through actual work . . . ” [Wade Martins, 1980, pp. 170-171].
‘Wear and tear’ is central to the capitalist idea of the circulation
of fixed capital and accounting for depreciation to recover its
cost.
The Leveson-Gower estates also invested heavily from the
1790s to increase the returns from its tenants’ farms. With the
appointment of John Bishton as chief agent in 1788, “more land-
lord capital than ever before was poured into both of the major
properties . . . as a means of raising rents a view that coincided
exactly with that of the young George Granville who inherited
the estates in 1805 . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, pp. 57-58]. The switch
from an emphasis on consumption to an emphasis on the rate-
of-return from productive investment was, for Marx, the essence
of the landlords’ revolution. By 1850 “interest on landlord’s capi-
tal was a major element in rent”, accounting for some 60% on
average [Holderness, 1981, p. 233].
The Rate of Rent: A landlord keeping his final accounts using
charge and discharge, could still indicate a capitalist mentality
by keeping separate records of investment and showing concern
for the rate of rent. Coke’s audit books, for example, distinguish
land purchases and buildings from repairs. From 1790 to 1882
the total invested in the estate recorded in the accounts was
£536,818 [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 99]. It is unclear how accurate
this total is as it includes a large element for buildings and
repairs [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 99]. Wade Martins thinks Coke’s
investment produced a modest incremental return of 7.6% even
without allowing for an increase in the value of land, or for the
fact that rents might have increased anyway, or that rents in
1882 were at a peak [Wade Martins, 1980, pp. 99-100]. She says
the return could be as low as 4.6%. By contrast, if we take
Coke’s investment as £536,818, with net rents of £59,709, the
estate’s rate of rent in 1882 was 11.1%. Which rate-of-return was
in Coke’s mind? Wade Martin’s incremental rate-of-return ig-
nores the capital invested by Coke and his tenants in 1790, and
they are not in constant prices. To estimate the real capital in
1790 and 1883 would require considerable work even if the data
exists. To show why it could change Coke’s appreciation of his
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returns, suppose, for example that from 1790 to 1883 the capital
in Coke’s estates doubled. If so, the rate of rent in 1790 was 3.4%
[£18,461/£536,818], and by 1883 it was 5.6% [£59,709/
£1,073,636]. Only if, say, the capital in 1790 was a quarter of
that in 1883, would the rate of rent fall with investment from
13.8% to 8.8%. Similar problems arise with Spring’s analysis of
the seventh Duke of Bedford’s “modest” returns from investment
between 1842 and 1861 [1963, p. 49]. Wade Martins explains
Coke’s apparently low returns by notionally adding the “intan-
gible” returns of the “admiration” of his fellow landlords [1980,
p. 104]. Thomas William, however, seemed generally happy with
his returns, and wanted the world to admire him for his invest-
ments. He “took pride in the amount he had invested in his
estates”, and “boasted” in his will (and before he died) that he
had spent £500,000 [Parker, 1975, pp. 94, 154].
Coke’s accounts distinguished expenditure on “improve-
ments” for each estate. Although this heading disappeared after
1784 [Parker, 1975, p. 56], the accountants continued to distin-
guish capital and revenue expenditures. Parker questions
whether they consistently distinguished repairs from improve-
ments, citing an item the accountants classified as improvement
in 1745 “for ‘making new banks, mending old banks’ . . . ”
[Parker, 1975, p. 56]. To decide whether they should have classi-
fied the latter as repairs or improvement we must understand
what the accountants meant by “mending”. At that time it could
mean to ‘amend’, to ‘improve in quality’, to ‘supplement’. If the
workers ‘amended’, that is, converted, the old banks into new
banks (for example, made them wider, deeper, different slope)
the accountants were right to classify this expenditure as im-
provement in the capitalist sense — to increase the store of use-
values available or lower their cost.
Parker’s other example is payments, which he says, “were
not capital investment at all, such as payments to outgoing ten-
ants for crops left growing on their farms . . . ” [1975, pp. 56-57].
While not fixed capital, these payments were for capital of circu-
lation. Parker also questions whether payments for marling are
“fixed investment . . . ” [1975, p. 57], and this after he repeatedly
tells us that the beneficial effects last for up to thirty years! After
the improvements heading disappeared, the accountants did not
religiously distinguish repairs and improvements, particularly
when the repairs element was small [Parker, 1975, p. 95]. Coke’s
books distinguished expenditure on drainage only from 1851
when it became the estate’s responsibility [Wade Martins, 1980,
p. 96], and struck the balance of the “net proceeds” of the estate
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after “everything needed to keep the estate in good order had
already been taken . . . ” [Parker, 1975, p. 22].
This organization of the accounts reflected Coke’s manage-
ment of the estate. It suggests a strong commitment to the main-
tenance of his estate as his productive capital. As Parker says,
“[t]he fact is expressive of a state of mind. The estate was the
basis of all the Coke life and its efficient management was axi-
omatic. . . . Spending on it . . . was accounted for as a prior
charge, coming before [large] housekeeping and personal
needs . . . ” [1975, p. 22]. On the face of it, this could suggest the
feudal idea of physical capital maintenance. However, evidence
consistent with concern for the rate of rent is provided by the
fact that when Mr Blaikie became the land steward he made
clear that he thought Coke had over invested [Wade Martins,
1980, p. 95].
Certainly, it might seldom be possible to find repair costs as
a separate item in the accounts [Beckett, 1986, p. 201]. Ac-
counts, however, often highlighted important items of capital.
For example, in the accounts of the second Viscount Towns-
hend, “ditch and hedgework, marling took special time and la-
bor to accomplish, so it was accounted for separately as an
extraordinary expenditure . . . , an acknowledgement of its status
as capital improvement . . . ” [Rosenheim, 1989, p. 127]. The ac-
counts of Guy’s Hospital’s estates did not distinguish repairs
from new buildings, but they distinguished other key items of
capital expenditure. The Abstract dating from 1762 distin-
guished between rates and taxes, buildings and repairs, money
spent on sea walls and river banks, planting woods, allowances
to tenants, and agents’ salaries and fees [Trueman, 1975, p. 522].
We must also look outside the final accounts for evidence of
concern with capital. Until 1864 the Bute accounts made no
distinction between capital and revenue, and no accounts sur-
vive for Bute’s Docks. Nevertheless, Bute knew from various
documents that his Ship Canal cost £222,000 in cash [Napier,
1991, pp. 173, 170]. As Laurence said, before a steward
“engageth in any Work of Consequence relating either to In-
closures, or Architecture, or Draining, &c. [he] should first send
as exact an Estimate as possible, what the same will amount to,
that his Lord may sit down and count the Cost, and make a
deliberate Judgment, whether the Charge will answer his Expec-
tations in the propos’d Benefit . . . ” [1731, p. 78].
Evidence consistent with landlords pursuing the rate of rent
is their tendency to invest more of their rentals in bad times,
and less in good times [Holderness, 1971, p. 178]. Historians
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usually explain this by the fluctuating need of the landlord to
“attract or retain tenants . . . ” [Rule, 1992, p. 60; Turner, Beckett
and Afton, 1996, p. 208; Holderness, 1981, p. 234]. They see the
landlord’s decision to invest heavily in fixed capital as the same
as his decision to allow arrears, take over taxes and repairs, or
to reduce his rent, simply the transfer of “income” [Turner,
Beckett and Afton, 1996, p. 208]. An alternative argument is that
tenants were more reluctant in bad times to undertake fixed
capital investment for which, until the later 19th century, they
typically had no legal security [Squarey, 1877, p. 435]. In good
times, when the farmer found it relatively easy to earn the gen-
eral rate of profit, the landlord persuaded him to make fixed
capital investments. In bad times the landlord could not do this
so easily. To maintain their rents, the landlords had to invest
more in fixed capital. For example, suppose at the necessary
level of fixed capital investment rF = 0.15, KF/ KL = 0.5, and rG =
0.1, then the rate of rent is 17.5% = (0.15 + 0.5[0.15 - 0.1]) x 100.
Suppose bad times arrive and that if the landlord does not invest
in additional fixed capital, rF will fall to 0.12 and his rate of rent
will fall to 13%. Suppose, however, that if the landlord invests
the necessary fixed capital rF only falls to 0.14. If, thereby, the
proportion of capital the farmer provides, KF/KL, falls to (say)
0.25, the rate of rent is 15%. As Mingay says, “enforced expendi-
ture in the difficult years . . . was merely an alternative to unwel-
come reductions in rentals . . . ” [1963, pp. 178-179]. In good
times, the less the landlord invests in fixed capital the higher his
rate of rent, and we expect him to persuade tenants to take more
of the burden. By the same logic, an advantage of leasing mines
instead of direct working was that the landlord minimized his
capital investment [Mingay, 1963, p. 193]. The history of land-
lord investment in agricultural fixed capital supports this model.
Until the reforms of the late 19th century, when a tenant left
the farm his fixtures became the property of the landlord
[Holderness, 1981, p. 233]. In practice the landlord did not often
enforce his rights and farmers generally did invest in fixed capi-
tal [Holderness, 1981, p. 233], possibly a third of the total over
the period 1750-1870 in East Anglia [Holderness, 1972, p. 446],
for example. Nevertheless, reflecting the legal uncertainty, the
conventional wisdom was that the farmer should invest only in
working capital [Currie, 1981, p. 77]. The landlord provided the
fixed capital ‘embodied in the land’ and the farmer provided the
‘working capital’ he could take with him. In practice, however,
this distinction became blurred, tenants often investing in em-
bodied fixed capital. For example, during the Napoleonic Wars,
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1793-1815, when prices and rents increased, “farmers were re-
quired to take more initiatives . . . [and landlords’] outgoings,
except on enclosure, were kept to a minimum . . . ” [Holderness,
1972, p. 441]. In East Anglia, the proportion of landlords’ rents
spent on improvements and repairs fell sharply from 1796 to
1806 [Holderness, 1972, Table 2, p. 439]. However, although the
conventional distinction blurred in the heady days up to 1815, in
the recession that followed farmers saw its wisdom clearly, per-
haps for the first time in a generation. In the recession and for
some years tenants became unwilling to make permanent im-
provements, and landlords became obliged to provide funds for
investment, often in lieu of rent reductions [Currie, 1981, p. 77].
The rate of rent helps to explain broad patterns of landlord
investment. However, to explain why particular landlords
adopted particular strategies we must understand their mentali-
ties. The Dukes of Marlborough, for example, neglected the
buildings on their estate [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 138]. This
neglect might have been the product of a feudal mentality.
Landlords were not inevitably capitalists. As his steward said
after Coke of Norfolk’s death, he could have used the £500,000
for “‘Horse racing or any other Gambling transaction if he had
been so inclined’ . . . .” [quoted in Parker, 1975, p. 154, fn.65].
Coke could have lived in the typically feudal way and focused
solely on consumption. To be capitalists landlords need not nec-
essarily be heavy or consistent investors. Some might attempt to
get the going rate of rent by a policy of minimal investment
[Holderness, 1981, p. 233]. Suppose, for example, that the land-
lord invests fixed capital to the point where rF = 0.15, the rate of
rent is 0.1625 = 0.15 + 0.25 (0.15 - 0.1). If the landlord invests
less, rF = 0.14 and rents are correspondingly lower, then he will
get the same rate of rent so long as the proportion of capital the
farmer provides does not fall below 56.25%, i.e., 0.1625 = 0.14 +
0.5625(0.14 - 0.1). Thus, it is possible that although in 18th
century literature “landowners continue to be represented as
‘big spenders’ and not frugal investors . . . ” [O’Brien and Heath,
1994, p. 53], many were capitalists. From 1750, “many progres-
sive landlords shifted their method of estimating gross income
from the number of rents to the interest charged on capital and
labour annually expended . . . ” [Davidoff and Hall, 1987, p. 204].
In Marx’s terms, many shifted from pursuing feudal rent to the
pursuing the capitalist rate of rent, and imposed this mentality
on their tenants. “This calculation of profitability, enforced by
cost conscious estate agents and bailiffs, influenced farmers. An
Essex man who farmed over 1000 acres saw himself ‘more in the
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nature of a person employing capital than a farmer’ . . . .”
[Davidoff and Hall, 1987, p. 204]. Although capitalist farmers
first created capitalist landlords, from the 1750s it is more likely
it will be the Lord pressing the farmer to become a capitalist,
than the other way round. One of the mechanisms landlords
used to create capitalist mentalities in their tenants was shorten-
ing the length of their leases.
The Length of Leases: Many agricultural experts (for example,
Arthur Young) advocated long leases because they thought secu-
rity of tenure gave the “illusion of ownership” [Wordie, 1982, p.
185] that encouraged the farmer to invest in the farm. An obvi-
ous problem for the landlord, however, was the inability to raise
rents quickly if prices increased, and for the tenant the
landlord’s reluctance to reduce them if prices fell. This argu-
ment weighed heavily with landlords from 1750 as prices and
rents rose, and by 1850 the majority of tenants had yearly
lettings [Holderness, 1981, p. 234; Turner, Beckett and Afton,
1997, p. 199]. If the tenants were substantial capitalist farmers
(as Young assumed) the balance of incentives could favor a long
lease [Wordie, 1982, p. 185]. If the landlord did not rent to
substantial capitalist farmers willing and able to invest in fixed
capital and bear the risks, the balance of the argument swung
towards short leases. Furthermore, if the capitalist landlord
could not take the capitalist mentality of his tenants for granted
— as Coke of Norfolk, for example, probably could — short
leases could help him impose and sustain it. One reason for
introducing short leases was so that “rack-rented farms could
. . . become subject to market forces . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and
Afton, 1997, p. 199], but another was that they made tenants
more accountable to landlords.
The short lease became an engine of capitalist revolution. A
prominent example was its use on the Leveson-Gower estates.
James Loch, their chief agent from 1812, used short leases com-
bined with landlord investment in fixed capital to hold tenants
accountable for the maximum return on capital. Loch had a
keen interest in capitalist accounting. In 1835 he recommended
that the Earl of Dudley should use “double-entry forms, capital
accounting, and the break-down of accounts to provide specific
information such as net profit on individual concerns, adminis-
trative expenses, debts outstanding, or receipts from invest-
ments . . . ” [Raybould, 1973, p. 231]. Loch’s predecessors from
Thomas Tibbetts in 1722 also insisted on DEB [Wordie, 1982, p.
36]. For the Earl’s mines Loch recommended depreciating the
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capital cost or value for wear and tear. The accountant should
prepare a “capital account”, an “Account of the value of all the
Articles and Machinery, including the Cost or Value of the Pits
themselves at each work should also be taken annually with
such additions or the contrary as the case may have occurred . . .
and a certain sum per cent should be written off yearly on Ac-
count of the loss for Tear and Wear . . . ” [quoted in Raybould,
1973, p. 233]. There seems every reason to think Loch would
have the same attitude towards agricultural fixed capital
[Raybould, 1973, p. 233].
Loch revolutionized the estate’s management structure, ap-
pointing full time specialists in building, surveying, law, ac-
counting, etc [Wordie, 1982, p. 64]. His opposition to long leases
came from his desire to be “free from any troublesome restric-
tions . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, p. 184]. One was a shortage of capital
diverting the tenants away from generating the maximum rate-
of-return. To maximize the returns, to focus on the “unfettered
cultivation of the soil”, the tenants must not only use the most
appropriate techniques, but must increase their working capital
[Wordie, 1982, p. 219]. Loch also encouraged the tenants to
invest their own capital because “by increasing their output
through improved efficiency . . . [they would] get . . . a larger
return from a larger bulk sale . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, p. 225]. Simi-
larly, the landlord’s rate of rent would increase. The major re-
striction faced by Loch, however, was that capitalist improvers
were not universal on the estates. Stimulated by frequent visits
to Coke’s Holkham and other areas of improvement, Loch set
about generalizing best practice capitalist farming throughout
the Leveson-Gower estates [Wordie, 1982, pp. 204-213]. These,
with heavy investment by the landlord, were the carrots. The
stick was the accountability of the tenants for their financial
performance, and at the heart of this was the short lease.
Loch had almost eliminated long leases by 1820 [Wordie,
1982, p. 214]. Short leases provided the legal foundation of his
system of accountability because, while the landlord could do
little if the tenant farmed badly or exploited the land, he could
easily evict and sue for unpaid rent. In practice, most annual
tenants enjoyed security of tenure, and in this sense the differ-
ence with long leases was “insignificant” [Holderness, 1981, p.
234]. However, this supports the argument that short leases
meant tenants were accountable. Accountability works when the
threat of punishment produces the desired behavior. That farm-
ers on yearly lettings were as secure as tenants on long leases
suggests they satisfactorily discharged their accountability.
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“Those who held at will did not dare to exploit their farms for
fear of the watchful agents and the threat of six month’ no-
tice . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, pp. 220-221]. On the contrary, many
tenants had invested heavily in their farms [Wordie, 1982, p.
223]. Despite Loch’s claimed ideal that landlords should invest
in fixed capital, he cajoled many tenants to do this [Wordie,
1982, pp. 218, 222-223, 221]. He clearly offended their capitalist
sensibilities when he “robbed them of what they considered to
be their just reward for improvements by raising rents as soon
as these had been carried out . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, p. 223]. For
Wordie this illustrates “the eternal dilemma, the great di-
chotomy of the whole landlord-tenant system . . . ” [1982, p.
220]. He is right that the landlord and tenant shared a common
interest “up to a point” — for Marx, the point where the tenant
gets the general rate of profit on a large capital, and the landlord
gets the maximum rate of rent. It is questionable, however,
whether the Leveson-Gower experience shows that “thereafter
their interests diverged . . . ” [Wordie, 1982, p. 220]. From the
capitalist viewpoint, charging rent to expropriate the tenants’
returns on their own fixed capital went too far, was ‘unfair’
[Wordie, 1982, pp. 191-192, 225].
Capital Adequacy and the Size of Farms: Many landlords thought
it “dangerously imprudent to let a farm to a tenant who lacked
sufficient capital to stock it and run it properly . . . ” [Mingay,
1975, pp. 48-49]. The landlord had to calculate the necessary
capital to know if the tenant had sufficient. Arthur Young’s cal-
culations in The farmer’s guide in hiring and stocking farms 1770,
illustrates how progressive landlords probably thought about
the problem. Allen says Young’s aim “was to determine how
much a farm was worth, but his calculations ignored most of
the capital costs and so overstated the value . . . ” [1992, p. 183].
In particular, he says Young ignored depreciation [Allen, 1992,
p. 183]. Young’s aim, however, was not to value the farm. It was
to show how it was that “farms are every day hired with much
smaller sums of money than the most considerate persons
would allot for the purpose . . . ” [quoted in Mingay, 1975, p. 49].
Young calculates the minimum money capital required by the
farmer of a 400-acre farm over its first three years of operation
[Mingay, 1975, p. 53]. That is, the least amount he can get away
with and expect to survive. As Young’s purpose was to show the
inadequacy of focusing solely on cash, he made no charge for
depreciation. He well understood that capital to finance a few
years’ cash flows would be inadequate because the capital the
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farmer needs to work his farm is not merely the cash outlays
required in the first few years. It includes necessary reserves to
withstand adversity and funds to make investments in fixed
capital [Mingay, 1975, p. 55]. Without sufficient capital, for ex-
ample, a “vein of the finest marl may be under his fields; he can
have nothing to do with it . . . ” [quoted in Mingay, 1975, p. 55].
The landlord could display a capitalist mentality by his atti-
tude to the size of farms. Farms were exceptionally large on
Coke’s estates, and grew larger [Parker, 1975; Wade Martins,
1980], but the size of farms in general steadily increased, par-
ticularly from around 1750 [Beckett, 1990; Allen, 1992]. This
trend supports Marx’s view that the capitalist mentality was set-
ting in because large, efficiently run farms produced higher re-
turns on capital and therefore higher rents. How big farms
should be to maximize the rate-of-return on capital depends on
the circumstances. These circumstances — particularly the sup-
ply of farmers with sufficient capital — changed over time
[Holderness, 1981]. The capitalist principle is to choose the size
of farm that gives the highest return on capital. As a steward of
the Marquis of Bath put it in 1794, those “farms are of the most
proper size, which return the most proportional produce at the
least proportional expense . . . ” [quoted in Beckett, 1983, p.
318]. If farms of optimal size produce the highest output per
acre for the least cost per acre, it follows they produce the high-
est profit per acre and therefore the highest rate-of-return on
capital per acre. From the 1730s successive writers argued for
an increase in farm sizes [Beckett, 1983, p. 313]. Beckett thinks
Young was virtually alone in his “doctrinaire beliefs” about the
virtues of large farms; that farms should be big regardless of the
circumstances [1983, pp. 321, 324]. In fact, Young advocated
large farms for strictly capitalist reasons. As Hermann Levy
pointed out, Young’s concern was “looking simply at the great-
est possible profit to be made, or at the purely economic fitness
of things”. It was only “from the latter point of view [that] he
had defended the large farm system on the profitableness of
corn growing . . . ” [quoted in Beckett, 1983, p. 323, fn.57]. Ac-
cording to Young, the size of farms should not be indiscrimi-
nate, but chosen to maximize “profitableness”. Young judged
many farms of his day to be too small whereas others disagreed.
However, this does not make him an isolated doctrinaire. In
Beckett’s view, “the debate went against Young”, but he con-
cedes “the fact that in 1851 a third of the cultivated acreage was
held in farms of 300 acres or more suggests that his views were
not entirely lost on the landowning community . . . ” [1983, p.
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323]. He says that some of Levy’s comments suggest that Young
mellowed in his later years and “became more enamoured of
small holdings . . . ” [Beckett, 1983, p. 323, fn.57]. Levy, how-
ever, does not say Young changed his mind about the economics
of large farms, only that he became concerned about their social
consequences [Beckett, 1983, p. 323, fn.57].
Allen says Young misunderstood the relationship between
the size of a farm and its capital. Allen finds that capital per acre
declined with farm size, and thinks it “remarkable that Young’s
data contradict his belief that large-scale farmers practised a
more capital-intensive agriculture than small-scale farmers . . . ”
[1992, p. 195]. Allen’s interpretation of what Young means by
‘capital intensity’ is debatable. Young does not say that capital
per acre increased with farm size, but that a “considerable
farmer, with a greater proportional wealth than the small occu-
pier, is able to work great improvements in his business . . . ; he
can build, hedge, ditch, plant, plough, harrow, drain, manure,
hoe, weed, and, in a word, execute every operation of the busi-
ness, better and more effectually than a little farmer . . . ”
[Young, quoted in Allen, 1992, p. 190]. The capital employed by
the wealthier farmer is larger and its economic efficiency “bet-
ter” than a smaller capital. “He [the wealthy farmer] also em-
ploys better cattle and uses better implements; he purchases
more manures, and adopts more improvements”. This is
Young’s capital-intensive farmer, one who has better capital and
implements per acre. Having better quality capital is consistent
with needing less capital per acre. For example, larger farms
could use better wagons to cart their produce to market more
cheaply. Young thought the poor state of the roads made “the
expense of carrying out the corn . . . prodigious”. However,
“[s]ome savings may be made . . . by using broadwheeled wag-
ons, for which reason they should ever be used on farms large
enough for 9 or 10 horses . . . ” [quoted in Mingay, 1975, p. 158].
Marx had the same view: “in production on a larger scale; the
saving is on the keeping of horses and other production costs,
not by the use of more capital on the same land . . . ” [1981, p.
814].
It is undoubtedly true that “whatever may have been the
case at [Coke’s estates at] Holkham, elsewhere large farms did
not bring in the greatest rents . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and Afton,
1997, p. 13], but this evidence is not necessarily inconsistent
with large farms producing the maximum rate of rent. For ex-
ample, Nathaniel Kent said, “it is to large estates that we look
for moderation in rents, as they were generally let upon a fair
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and consistent scale . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997, p.
13]. Kent’s words are consistent with large estates (with large
farms) charging capitalist, that is, “fair and consistent” rents. It
may be true that small farms “were more likely to yield high
rents, pro rata, because they were worked more intensively and
effectively . . . ” [Turner, Beckett and Afton, 1997, p. 13]. But
why, then did landlords not break up their farms? The answer
may be a limited and diminishing supply of small farmers with
capital to work them, although this varied over time, and limited
administrative resources at the landlords’ disposal to exploit
them. With limited supplies of small farmers with capital, the
only feasible long-term option was the trend towards larger
farms because their “advantages . . . lay in their lower unit costs
rather than their greater output [per acre] . . . ” [Turner, Beckett
and Afton, 1997, p. 13]. In other words, their advantage was
their higher rate-of-return on capital and rate of rent.
CONCLUSION:
MARX’S ‘QUEER’ STORY OF RENT AND
THE AGRICULTURAL ROOTS OF
THE BRITISH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
Detailed study of changes in landlords’ accounts and sys-
tems of accountability could allow us to test systematically for
the appearance and spread of the capitalist mentality in this
important class from around 1750. We have seen some evidence
of DEB in estate accounts becoming more common from
around 1750. There is some evidence of capitalist calculations
for enclosure decisions; of calculations to assess the capital ad-
equacy of tenants, to determine rent increases and rebates.
There is evidence of concern for the rate of rent; the length of
leases; and for the size of farms. While we need systematic re-
search to fill in the many gaps left by economic historians, these
phenomena support Marx’s view that the capitalist mentality
became lodged in the collective mind of the landed class from
around 1750. Future research must encompass the farm ac-
counts of the larger landowners and lesser gentry, tenants and
bailiffs’ accounts. Nor must we forget the writings, accounts and
calculations of land stewards from which came many well-
known advocates of improvement in addition to Edward
Laurence and Arthur Young — those such as William Marshall,
Thomas Stone, Nathaniel Kent, and Thomas Davis [Mingay,
1967, p. 27]. Tracing the development of capitalism in agricul-
ture should help to trace its development in industry, Marx’s
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industrial revolution, and the interactions with the agricultural
revolution. Historians disagree about the existence and nature
of any links between the agricultural and industrial revolutions
[Jones, 1974; Clark, 1999]. For Marx, the key link is the replica-
tion in industry of the capitalist mentality and the social rela-
tions of production created by the agricultural revolution. What
follows outlines his theory of the interconnections between
these revolutions, his ‘queer story’ of rent, and calls for account-
ing history research on this neglected question.
Marx argued that increases in absolute rent and not differ-
ential rent underlay the rapid rise of rents in the later 18th
century because, although the productivity of agriculture was
increasing, it was growing at a much slower rate than in manu-
facturing. In his theory, “absolute rent . . .  arises from the fact
that capital is invested in agriculture rather than manufacture; a
rent that is quite independent of differential rent or excess prof-
its which are yielded by capital invested in better land . . . ”
[Marx, 1969b, p. 242]. Today, the neo-classical orthodoxy recog-
nizes only Ricardian differential rent. Ricardo ruled out abso-
lute rent because he assumed the average prices of all commodi-
ties always equaled their labor values. He also assumed that the
organic composition of capital (the ratio of variable capital to
total capital employed) was the same in agriculture and industry
[Marx, 1969b, pp. 129, 244]. Ricardo’s theory of rent, therefore,
effectively ruled out the agricultural revolution and any further
radical development in industry, making a “twofold historical
error . . . ” [Marx, 1969b, p. 244]. Ricardo assumed the produc-
tivity of labor in agriculture and industry were equal, and that
with population growth agriculture’s productivity would fall
[Marx, 1969b, p. 244]. By contrast, in Marx’s theory absolute
rent arose from “the relatively faster development of manufac-
ture (in fact the truly bourgeois branch of industry) as against
agriculture . . . ” [1969, pp. 18-19]. This is Marx’s “queer” story of
rents. It began in the late 17th century when rents increased as
capitalistic manufacturing appeared. From around 1750 real (in-
flation-adjusted) rents began to increase more steeply as the
‘industrial’ revolution gathered momentum as capitalists pur-
sued the real subsumption of labor. Landlords and their advi-
sors agreed with the political economists that all rent was differ-
ential; that real increases arose from agricultural improvement.
Landlords therefore invested or had farmers invest, continually
boosting agricultural productivity in their search for differential
rent. The search continued until, during the last quarter of the
19th century, after a sustained period of high investment, the
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productivity of agriculture caught up with a now stagnating in-
dustry dominated by coal and cotton [Marx. 1969b, p. 110].
Combined with cheap food imports, the rapid increase in labor
productivity in agriculture during the later 19th century caused
absolute rent to fall sharply. “Landlords were frequently disap-
pointed by the way rents did not rise in proportion to the money
invested . . . ” [Wade Martins, 1980, p. 98]. According to Marx,
landlords were unwittingly reducing absolute rent, undermining
their own privileged position through their zealous commitment
to the capitalist mentality. When rents fell in the later 19th cen-
tury the landlords radically restructured their portfolios out of
land and into stocks and shares [Beckett, 1986]. Having helped
to spread the capitalist mentality throughout society, the land-
lords, “reduced to a mere receptacle, ceased to fulfill any func-
tion in production” [Marx, 1969b, p. 56], and became absorbed
within social capital.
To test Marx’s theory of the industrial revolution we must
investigate farmers’ and landlords’ accounts in conjunction with
those of industrial entrepreneurs [Bryer, 2004a; 2004b]. During
the 18th century, “the distinction between landowners and in-
dustrialists tended inevitably to be somewhat blurred . . . ”
[Mingay, 1963b, p. 199]. Industrial enterprises often “developed
out of the estates themselves, such as coal-mines, iron- and cop-
per-mines, and even ironworks, canals and tar distilleries, some
of which grew to considerable size . . . ” [Pollard, 1965, p. 211].
It was no accident that land stewards “branched out as entrepre-
neurs on their own account and often built up important indus-
trial concerns . . . ” [Mingay, 1967, p. 4]. There are clear links
between estate managers and emerging industrial enterprises
[Pollard, 1965, pp. 25-30]. They had the knowledge, experience,
capital, and many probably had a capitalist mentality. Given a
shared capitalist mentality, it is not “surprising that in these
circumstances that early methods of industrial management
were borrowed from the great estate . . . ” [Mingay, 1967, pp. 4-
5]. Nor is it surprising that by 1750 some management tech-
niques developed on the leading estates “showed many of the
characteristics of the adolescent industrial firms . . . ” [Pollard,
1965, p. 26]. Mepham, for example, finds that industrial depart-
mental cost accounting paralleled development in farm account-
ing: “Arthur Young proposed a farm accounting system in which
there was a ‘departmental’ ledger for each field . . . ” [Mepham,
1988, p. 60]. Young’s tours included some major industrial
firms, and his cost accounting for farmers (e.g., 1797) was thor-
oughly modern, mirroring the development of accounting in the
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industrial revolution [Juchau, 2002, p. 378; Bryer, 2004a].
The limited accounting evidence we have supports Marx’s
view that landlords and industrialists were becoming capitalists
together. Jones asks of the clearly capitalist accounts of Thomas
Lovett (summarized above), “to what extent was this kind of
thinking being paralleled in the developing industries in the
later eighteenth century? . . . ” [1985, p. 72]. His research into
early cost accounting in Wales shows the parallels are striking
[Jones, 1985]. Jones thinks it “perfectly natural for the mid-
eighteenth century to have seen . . . a system of bookkeeping and
accountability based on double entry . . . embraced by . . . land-
lords and industrial and commercial entrepreneurs alike . . . ”
[1985, p. 60]. However, to establish and explain this conver-
gence we must find and explain broad trends in social account-
ability; demonstrate exactly what the “community of interests”
was that arose from the “intermingling of men of commerce and
landowning . . . ” [Mingay, 1963b, p. 263]. To do this we must
identify and explain the accounts of many individuals, starting
with the early capitalist farmers that Marx and others [e.g.,
Tawney, 1941, 1954] say began the agricultural revolution
[Bryer, 2004c].
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